Reading Heidegger’s work is im-possible. This work is a challenge to interpretation, assimilation, mimetic reproduction. At the same time it resists every rapprochement, not however for being mysterious or profound. This resistance has its own formal nature, as it in no way obstructs the literary and philosophical assimilation of Heidegger’s thought. No passages in Heidegger’s work can be pointed out that oppose the literature on Heidegger, or that are overlooked by this literature. Yet the entire Heidegger-literature bypasses Heidegger in a specific way. When this happens, this literature is against Heidegger. No matter how multifaceted and correct the interpretations of Heidegger may be, they still leave “something” untouched through their way of asking. This “something” cannot be indicated in any specific regard. A curious indifference encircling the Heidegger-literature manifests itself.

In his early Freiburg lecture courses, Heidegger warns his readers against any philosophical and therefore literary reception of his work. “Man ignoriere lieber das Buch, als daß man darüber das heute übliche fade Geschreihe und Gerede mache, das seit langer Zeit bei uns blüht” (“It is better to ignore the book than to produce the usual insipid scribbling and chatter that has been flourishing in our midst for so long”.) All of this is literature (GA61 193, cf. 70). This does not mean that my intention now will be to write about Heidegger in a way that is interesting or fascinating. In all writing about lies hidden the nature of literature. All literature about Heidegger reproduces Heidegger, argues something, divides his work into periods, places his work in time, criticizes it—and is therein surrounded by indifference.
What remarkable phenomenon is this, that a cloud of oblivion, the dying breath of *Vorhandenheit* (presence-at-hand), has shrouded all secondary literature about Heidegger? In order to answer this question, we must first of all obtain clarity about the formal resistance that Heidegger himself presents to interpreting his work. At the outset of his thinking he points out that his work is in no way a continuation of the philosophical discourse of western tradition. For in this discourse something general and definite is established. In Heidegger’s work nothing is established. It therefore has neither objectivity nor subjectivity. No discussion is possible about the “findings” of this thinking, since it does not argue for or against any proposition. In recognizing the finitude of knowledge, fundamental-philosophical thinking has abandoned the pretence to absolute knowledge and the construction of philosophical systems. It does not follow, however, that fundamental-philosophical thinking is relative or perspectival. This thinking assumes no standpoints.

If Heidegger’s thinking is not thinking about but, as will be pointed out, shifts within the movement that is inherent to any thinking about, then any interpretation of Heidegger that speaks about his work has already moved away from it, has vaulted over it. That also applies to any division of this work into historical periods, as can be seen, for instance, in the title of the collection in which this essay appears. As soon as mention is made of the “early” Heidegger—whether he is opposed to the “later” Heidegger or placed in a continuum with him—Heidegger is positioned; in other words, he is an object of comparison: a re-presented subject.

If Heidegger’s work has no object of conversation and cannot be an object of conversation, this thinking can have no significance in any traditional-philosophical sense whatsoever; it leaves the history of philosophy to itself, and from beginning to end it is detached from any worldview (*Weltanschauung*), from any contribution to humanity, to values, and to culture. As a contribution to academic discourse understood as a value of western culture, the Heidegger-literature has already moved away from the horizon encompassing his thinking.

Not only can no object of this thinking be found, it is equally impossible to speak of a subject of this thinking, or of its addressee. The “author” of this work is not “somebody”, a “person” called Heidegger. The only sense in which we can speak of an ‘I’—and this appears from the beginning of Heidegger’s way (*Weg*) of thinking—is by pointing in the direction of “somebody” who is not yet there, who only becomes what he is in the concrete enactment of fundamental-philosophical questioning. It is impossible to call Heidegger a philosophical author. As for the copyright and biographical
side, “Heidegger” is of no significance, for this name is nothing but a sign along a way of thinking, a sign that is erected in treading the road and only then points the way. And who is being addressed? The “we” in which every philosophical discourse is necessarily embedded, does this indifferent “we” belong to the horizon that Heidegger points to? (See GA65 48.) Heidegger addresses neither humanity in general, nor a specific humanity (Menschentum), no philosophical or academic community nor even a human being as “we” know it. “We” read in the Beiträge, “No one understands what I am thinking, because every one understands ‘my’ attempt by tying it to what has gone before [Vergangenes] (and in so doing, leaving it to indifference). And whoever will understand ‘my’ attempt does not need it” (GA65 8). The essential question is, what do these inverted commas mean?

Only a metamorphosis (Verwandlung) of author and reader, a breaking-through to the supposedly necessary solidarity of the “we” of philosophical discourse, makes the writing of Heidegger possible as well as “our” answering to this possibility. This metamorphosis breaks through every communality and generality of philosophical discourse. Listening to this thinking takes place in the utmost loneliness (Vereinzelung), which admits of no communication and hence no mimetic reproduction whatsoever (GA45 199). The question is how this metamorphosis of writer and reader can occur. In short: how is it possible to answer Heidegger when he refers to himself in inverted commas, when he speaks of Sein und Zeit as “dieses ’Buch’” in inverted commas (GA65 284)? How to read written words that do not constitute a book? And: how am I going to be the reader of this “book”?

The aporia of not knowing where and how to begin with Heidegger is needed in order to get into his way of thinking at all, which is to experience and articulate its impossibility. The place where this aporia arises can be found in a fundamental “against”. In a way Heidegger is against philosophical literature, the Heidegger-literature is against Heidegger, this article is both against this literature and against Heidegger. But this “against” will also have to contain the possibility of the exponentially expanding literary philosophy in such a way that the formal character of this “against” becomes clear. Since this “against” cannot be pinned down, cannot be followed back to an inaccuracy, an exchange of perspectives or a philosophical controversy, it is not to be understood as an anti.

Thinking against the Heidegger-literature and against Heidegger is not academic-philosophical “disproof” or “criticism”; it is taking seriously the datum that Heidegger does not speak about whatever it may be, and that therefore talking about Heidegger is
im-possible, when nonetheless writing “about” as a mimetic reproduction of indifference belongs essentially to Heidegger’s thinking. Writing against Heidegger is a continuous and tenacious repulsion of the possibility—never to be ruled out and by its nature lying in this work itself—of reading this work as a contribution to philosophical literature.

If this article concerns the “early” Heidegger from the early Freiburg lecture courses (§ 1) through *Sein und Zeit* to *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (§ 2), then this is not to point to a development in Heidegger’s thinking, or to state that he stands his “ground”; nor is it to “solve” “problems” in the interpretation of his work. The choice of texts has been determined only by the formal enquiry about the possibility of access to Heidegger’s thinking, a thinking that itself exists in no other sense than in finding access to “that which is”. In a fundamental sense, the texts chosen here are of a methodical nature, and therefore steer away from the unavoidable thought that *Sein und Zeit*, as a transitional work, should be a philosophical book with philosophical standpoints.

What the *Beiträge* says must be adhered to against *Sein und Zeit*: “Alle ‘Inhalte’ und ‘Meinungen’ und ‘Wege’ im Besonderen des ersten Versuchs von ‘Sein und Zeit’ sind zufällig und können verschwinden” (“All ‘contents’ and ‘opinions’ and ‘ways’, particularly of the initial attempt of *Being and Time*, are accidental and can disappear”) (GA65 242). The question whether I here and now really answer Heidegger’s indication of what constitutes proper understanding can only be sharpened in the actual writing of this article: “Wirkliches Verstehen bewährt sich nie im Nachsagen, sondern in der Kraft der Überleitung des Verstehens in ein wirkliches Handeln, in objektive Leistung, die keineswegs und gar nicht in erster Linie in der Vermehrung der philosophischen Literatur besteht”. (“Real understanding never proves itself in rote-saying, but rather in the force of carrying understanding over into real action, into objective performance, which never and in no way consists in the first place in adding to the philosophical literature”) (GA29/30 434).

I. “AGAINST”

The question that must become concrete and thereby more sharply pointed is: how to respond to the factum that Heidegger’s thinking merely concerns thinking itself, but is not meta-philosophical self-reflection in any sense? In their emptiness, self-reflections are pervaded by the indifference of *Vorhandenheit*. How to find the way to the thought
that the Gegenstand, the object, of fundamental philosophy is nothing but “having” this Gegenstand? The Fragwürdigkeit (question-worthiness) of philosophy consists of this having itself (GA61 19). The Gegenstand of philosophy is a Gehalt, but Gehalt is not content; rather it is being gripped by the asking itself, i.e., a hold. It consists of getting involved in the asking as a having-to-do-with (Bezug). In a provisional formal sense, it can be seen that the asking must become bound up with “that” for which it is asking. It must become held fast by it, gehalten. “das Etwas, wozu das Verhalten ist, ist das, was der Bezug bei sich hält, was von ihm und in ihm gehalten ist”. (“The something, towards which comportment is, is that which the having-to-do-with holds to itself, that which is held by it and in it”) (GA61 53). For the time being, these indications are void, they “do not say anything”. They indicate that the subject of philosophical asking is not ready to be discussed, but “becomes” only in and through the asking. The asking will have to become concrete, i.e., will have to become bound up with its “subject”. This bond begins to reign in the articulation of asking, i.e., in reading and in writing.

How to get involved in Heidegger’s thinking? Where to begin? It seems as if a beginning can be made anywhere and nowhere. An enigmatic factum is here: that this aporia reigns, that there is something like the impossibility of asking. This factum is enigmatic, because there is no situation for this asking. It cannot be understood why describing and explaining the world as the totality of re-presented entities should stop anywhere, could meet with resistance at any point whatsoever. Re-presenting as describing, clarifying, interpreting, changing, experiencing, securing is limitless in principle. In re-presentation as the way of being of all deeds, knowledge, and experience, there is an “and so on” that can move from one entity to another without any notable transition or delay. We board the train, talk to other people, call the dog, watch the sunset; we attend a lecture on philosophy, after which we go to a pub. In this extreme variety of possibilities for encounters there is a steady public openness: there is no resistance in the transitory character of the re-presented. The limitlessness of presence indicates the everydayness of all life, those things that concern “us” people every day, that indicate the day-side of presence: the absence of basic darkness or resistance in the “and so on”.

The movement of everydayness is the easy transition from one entity to another. This ease is further enhanced when it is understood that in this transience there is an augmentation (Steigerung): the transitions fan out and accelerate. The explanation, control, and experience of present objects progress, extend over ever new areas, enlarge, branch off. The entities, people included, are taken along in the movement of total
mobilization. The mobilization has not been manufactured and cannot be stopped. The objects and subjects re-presented are taken along in it, are involved in this movement beyond their control. That is why the mobilization is called “fall” (Sturz) in the early Freiburg courses, while the sense of it, which contains the possibility of understanding it (Verstehen), is called Ruinanz (ruinance). When being swept along in the mobilization is called “fall”, there is then the question of where the fall comes from and where it is broken, in short, where it meets with resistance. The answer is: nowhere. “…der Sturz ist lediglich und nur Sturz. Es gibt für diese Bewegtheit als solche keine Aufhaltbarkeit von etwas her, das von anderem Gegenstands- und Seinscharakter wäre als es selbst. The fall is simply and only the fall. For this movedness as such there is no halting from out of something that would have a character of an object and being other than its own” (GA61 145). This implies that the fall does not move in the direction of something else. No limit has been set to the progress, not even in the sense that interpreting inseparably belongs to the movement of falling. Everything present already belongs to presence (GA61 134; GA63 53). Presence means already having been interpreted: an indication of Ruinanz, in which literature, as well as the Heidegger-literature, is included.

Now it cannot be seen how there can be questions about this movement; there is no position to be taken outside this movement. It is utterly unclear how an “against” could ever appear in regard to this all-embracing movement. And yet there is the factum of the possibility of philosophically asking about this movement. There is something like “das interpretative Nachgehen und Verfolgen des Richtungscharakters der Ruinanz” (“the interpretive follow-up and pursuit of the directional character of the ruinance”). But interpreting is already involved in this Ruinanz, which is a “moment of the movedness” (Bewegtheitsmoment) of the asking itself. With that, however, asking is not simply ruinant, it is sturzbildend, it develops, articulates, accentuates the fall (GA61 149). Asking is not outside the movement of falling, but furthers its movement, is an augmentation of it. But if asking augments the movement of falling, then it is “something” within that movement which is even stronger than that movement. Then the factum of asking is a formal breach made in the well-rounded nature of re-presentation (GA61 151).

The question is, what is this breach? The philosophical asking does not detract one iota from the limitlessness of re-presentation—it is a “Steigerung” of it (GA61 136, 139, 154). Philosophical asking takes the progress of re-presentation to the extreme limit [escaton]. The “breach” in the limitlessness of re-presentation is not a restriction
of it, but the possibility that the limitlessness of re-presentation is increased to the utmost. This “utmost” is a formal emptiness that pervades and embraces the limitless re-presentation.

The formal emptiness appears in nothing other than the factum of the possibility of asking, more specifically in the confrontation of asking with the absence of its own necessity. There is no grip to be found for this asking, it gropes around in emptiness, since there is no place outside re-presentation. And yet the asking is there. The only thing that asking can do is to hold on to its own emptiness, to move within it. This seems to indicate that formal emptiness itself includes the possibility of philosophical asking, but this possibility is and remains empty—it is an im-possibility.

In a formal manner the emptiness keeps the asking away, whereas the possibility of asking lies only in this staying away. Only in abiding by this staying away can asking take place. Thus formal emptiness binds asking to itself. Only by holding onto this bond, by allowing the formal emptiness of asking to be directional for asking, can there be asking at all. The formal emptiness is directional, signaling; it is binding for the asking (GA61 33).

The formal emptiness is empty and yet it binds, because it allows for a movement to be experienced—the movement of the necessity of asking being kept away. This staying away of the necessity of asking is the nebulosity enveloping the limitlessness of re-presentation. The staying away of asking ensures that re-presentation can go on limitlessly. When asking enters into this staying away, it serves to bring Ruinanz to its extreme limit, the extreme limit that shows that re-presentation is well-rounded, is a whole in a singular way. This well-rounded nature appears in the philosophical thought that there is nothing but re-presentation. Outside re-presentation there is “nothing”, there is “emptiness”. But the thought that there is nothing but re-presentation is not itself re-presentative. This is a sign that the well-rounded nature of re-presentation can only emerge in an emptiness that stays away. When the well-rounded nature of re-presentation is mentioned, then thinking has lifted itself above [herausheben] the limitlessness of re-presentation, without getting outside it. It is here that formal emptiness speaks, the formal emptiness in which re-presentation as a whole rests. But re-presentation vaults over this staying away in which it rests. Only in this way can it be limitless and measureless. But then formal emptiness is the absent limit and measure of re-presentation, that to which it is bound.

Here the following datum appears: re-presentation cannot reach itself—it can only relate to itself in a re-presenting way. Any reflection about present objects, any
self-reflection of the subject, is already pervaded by Vorhandenheit. Thus re-presentation is interposed between itself and the access to itself. Re-presentation cannot reach its limit. Re-presentation keeps something away. This means that, according to its very own nature, it is against itself, namely, there where it derives its measure from itself, its measure being that in which it rests as re-presentation. Formal emptiness as measure stays away. The limitless nature of re-presentation is against its own limit; but there is no shortage or want in this “against”.

In the 1921-22 course, this is explained as follows: life is inside Ruinanz in the sense of being taken along from one meaning to another. It is bound to the movement of this tendency, which scatters itself everywhere and fortifies itself limitlessly. Thanks to this total mobilization of everydayness, of living “in den Tag hinein”, from day to day (GA61 101-102), representation can absorb everything. Life is settlement of distance in a hyperbolic increase (GA61 104). But in this movement of settling distance, life shuts itself off from the possibility of coming towards itself. The limitlessness of re-presentation and or re-presenting oneself is a mask, a formal blindness.

The limitlessness of re-presentation masks the extreme line in it, the de-limiting measure. Consequently the hyperbole (excess) of progress is at once an ellipsis (defect), a staying away. Strangely enough, the limit within limitlessness is not a restriction. If this were so, the “and-so-on” would certainly experience resistance from something else—which is incompatible with the phenomenon of the limitlessness of re-presentation itself. As delimitation, formal emptiness cannot stop re-presentation. It can only show that re-presentation’s being un-bound is in fact a keeping away of bounds. Despite its being un-bound, human life is fixed, not to one or another entity, but to the formal emptiness that binds by staying away. Thus, strictly speaking, re-presentation is against itself, in the sense that it stays away from its own measure. “Im Sorgen riegelt sich das Leben gegen sich selbst ab und wird sich in der Abriegelung gerade nicht los”.

(In caring, life cordons itself off against itself and in this cordonning-off is precisely not rid of itself”) (GA61 107).

The “against” is not an anti-, it does not oppose anything. It indicates the meaning of -less (-los) in the limit-less and the end-less, as the pushing away of formal emptiness—its own measure. The nature of the against lies in “away from”. The 1921-22 course states “daß sich in diesem Von-sich-weg des Lebens es selbst ein ‘Gegen-es’ ausbildet und durch und durch in dieser Ausbildung ‘ist’”, “that in this being-away-from itself belonging to life, it itself cultivates an ‘against it’ and ‘is’ in this cultivation through and through” (GA61 123). The strange thing is that this against is simply not
visible and interpretable. Its being away cannot be cancelled; it keeps itself away, and any interpretation that wants to put this staying-away aside is already part of its against, although it cannot truly get involved in it. The question is: how can this against be held fast?

For the time being, the against is formal emptiness. It is a pre-supposition that has yet to gain weight, as the interpretation enters into emptiness as its own presupposition (GA61 132). The possibility of a true concretion of asking lies only within Ruinanz, where the against is not ready and waiting to be interpreted. The against only truly becomes against in its interpretation, and its interpretation only truly becomes interpretation by entering into the against. This enigmatic growing together of interpretation and interpretandum, its Zusammenwachsen, the con-cretion, is the movement of fundamental-philosophical thinking. Not until thinking gets permeated with the movement of Ruinanz, and takes it to its extreme, does that against which Ruinanz is appear—and only then does the against become proper (eigentlich): “das (ruinante) Gegen, bzw. (formal) Wo-gegen als ein faktisch Eigentliches des Lebens”, “the (ruinous) against or the (formal) against-which as something factically proper belonging to life” (GA61 132-33).

Proper asking is against the im-proper-ty of Ruinanz: this does not mean that it is outside Ruinanz or is anti-Ruinanz. Being against the improper (Un-eigentlichkeit) means being against the staying away of the against in Ruinanz. This is an augmentation of the against, actually letting it reign. Proper-ty (Eigentlichkeit) is allowing the against of “proper” and “im-proper” to reign. Interpretation must not detach itself from the against, but must enter into it in such a way that the hiddenness against which interpretive clarity turns begins to reign over the interpretation. Interpreting is letting being-away be da (there) in its character of being-against.

To begin with, the “world” is the re-presented totality of re-presented entities: a cosmos or environment. But the progress of representation is being-in-the-world, where “in” indicates the familiarity in which re-presentation as a whole lives. The world as re-presented totality conceals the world in a more fundamental sense, as familiarity (Vertrautheit). This familiarity itself permeates the totality of re-presentation; it is all-embracing. Now the question is whether this familiarity itself does not rest in Ruinanz—is there not something that stays away in the familiarity of the world, viz., that this familiarity itself is without measure? Re-presentation is fully entering into the world, a being absorbed that cannot and need not ask any more questions about this. Then the familiar world is as it should be, an absorbing emptiness, an enclosing that
stays away. The world is the formal emptiness by which life as re-presentation “is held fast, to which it holds itself” (gehalten ist, woran es sich hält: GA61 86). Then the following applies: being in the world as being familiar with all things re-presented keeps its own emptiness away, and is thereby against itself.

Now the interpretation gains in concreteness. Being in the world as being familiar with everything is being confined by this formal emptiness. The world as totality of entities, and the world as familiarity with this totality, is a mask for the world in the proper sense, as that which encircles re-presentation as a heaviness—a heaviness that stays away and thereby drags re-presentation along. In being confining and entangling, the world lures the movement of Ruinanz towards itself. For the world, it is essential to be Umwelt, en-vironment, a heaviness that has coiled itself around re-presentation as an encompassing ring: the measure of re-presentation (GA61 129).

The world is called “Gehaltssinn”, the very sense of Gehalt, not for being the significance of the contents within the world, like a framework of rules, but because the world is the possibility of understanding, the openness in which re-presentation is bound. Fundamental philosophy has no content, but is driven by its Gehalt. The Gehalt is that which keeps to itself its way of having-to-do-with-it (Bezug). Philosophy can only venture to leap into its own “Gehaltensein”, being held, which is interpretation being held inside that by which it is enclosed (GA61 53). Philosophy is “Verhalten”, in the double sense of “behaving” and “having-to-do-with” (Bezogensein). Philosophy is the movement in the direction of that to which it is bound (gehalten) and by which it is surrounded. That means philosophy moves in the direction of the world that already encircles it. Philosophical interpretation is after that in which it is already confined. So the world is at once the Woraufhin, the upon-and-towards-which (the direction the interpretation takes) and the Worin, the wherein (that which already surrounds it) of interpretation.¹⁶

The heaviness of this being bound in the world, which hides itself in the lightness of re-presenting transience, is called facticity, as asking’s belonging and being bound in that in which asking rests. This “concept” must above all be kept away from any connection with the weight, the definiteness, the limitation, the passivity, or the fatality of human life; these are all present properties of present humanity as a subject. Facticity is a heaviness that can only become evident in a factual manner—in an asking that gets permeated with facticity. Facticity is concreteness keeping itself away, the weight of formal emptiness, the against-which of Ruinanz. The asking of philosophy becomes concrete by turning in upon facticity. This asking finds its source in facticity and goes back
into it (GA61 115). In this source, there reigns the “against” of facticity itself, the fundamental “against” in which facticity gives re-presentation the possibility to be measureless, even in the Heidegger-literature.

The entire way of thinking of Sein und Zeit is nothing but the way of thinking that returns to its own source, where that very source remains against this thinking. Already on p. 8/28 “we” can read the fundamental indication on how to understand this “book”. It cannot be understood as a book; it can only be understood as the very language of facticity: “Die wesenhaftie Betroffenheit des Fragens von seinem Gefragten gehört zum eigensten Sinn der Seinsfrage”. (“How the questioning is essentially affected by what is asked about belongs to the ownmost sense of the question of being.”) There is in the word Betroffenheit not only the sense of asking being struck (getroffen) by facticity, but also, especially, the sense of remaining ensnared: asking remains confined in that which it is after.

Only when asking lets itself be bound by facticity does it become concrete. Not until the moment of that concretion does the one who asks “come into existence”. Only in the leap away from the subjectivity of authorship, from the subjectivity that has always vaulted over its facticity, only in the leap toward facticity, which has always reigned, can the questioner’s own-ness (das Eigene) arise, can it be indicated “who” is asking. Here author and readers do not matter anymore, the questioner’s own “I” is a movement of “Hinzeigen auf mein konkretes faktisches Leben in seiner konkreten Welt”, “pointing towards my concrete factual life in its concrete world” (GA61 174). As the heaviness that surrounds the world of present entities and thus keeps asking away, facticity is as such the only possibility of asking. Entering into this possibility is the utmost loneliness: “die Wurzeln der eigenen Faktizität des eigenen konkreten Lebens”, “the roots of one’s own facticity belonging to one’s own life” (GA61 169). This impossible source of asking has only one possibility: the “against” of being there (da) and being away (weg), of the proper and the im-proper. Then facticity becomes what it already was: asking’s own possibility. That only happens when facticity unexpectedly gives the possibility of asking in a genuine sense.

Rational and empirical insights about present objects are essentially non-rational and non-empirical, inasmuch as they have vaulted over their own possibility, facticity.17 Truly empirical thinking will have to go back along the way into facticity. In asking’s being bound to facticity lies the only possibility of a bond, a measure for philosophical speaking: “die in der ergriffenen Faktizität entspringende Bindung der faktisch vollzogenen Verbindlichkeit”, “the binding (originating in the grip of facticity) of factically actual-
ized bindingness” (GA61 170). If being bound in facticity became a bond, so that facticity would set the measure for asking, then asking could take place in the name of facticity: “Der Gegenstand, wozu ich mich verhalte, bestimmt mit seinem eigensten Namen das Verhalten selbst”, “the object to which I comport and hold myself defines the comportment, the holding, with its own proper name” (GA61 60).

In going its own way, asking builds itself into its own source (Einbildung). It turns back to its own ground and roots. While asking becomes factual, facticity grows together with it (con-crescere), and calls upon asking to speak. In this growing together of asking and facticity, the existing indifferent meanings of the words belonging to everyday language as “conceptual tools” can leap toward their own source: a supporting word. Thus it may happen “daß den in der spezifisch nivellierten Rede des faktischen Lebens gebrauchten Bedeutungen aus der Explikation ein bestimmter Sinn zuspringt”, “that a particularly tuned sense springs out of the explication into the meanings used in the specifically levelled discourse of factual life” (GA61 126). The moment when the utmost loneliness of asking grows together with facticity, facticity finds its own word. This is the moment when facticity casts a glance (Blick) at the eye (Auge) of the interpreter: the Augenblick (the eye-opening moment).18

In an essential phrase from Sein und Zeit concerning language, there is the indication how this “book” has been written and how it should be read. On p. 161/204 it reads: “Den Bedeutungen wachsen Worte zu. Nicht aber werden Wörterdinge mit Bedeutungen versehen” (“Words grow towards meanings. It is not the case that word-things get supplied with meanings”).19 The existent, equalized meanings of words in the traffic of language contain the possibility that they be no longer Wörter (isolated words), but Worte (supportive words). That is not a matter of concocting a philosophical terminology. There are no word-things to which meanings are being clipped. The genesis of a supporting word is a zu-wachsen, a growth towards a word that occurs only when facticity, thanks to philosophical asking, is asked to speak, and when facticity genuinely speaks.

This leap toward one another of facticity and its factual interpretation will not erase the essential “against” of facticity, but will reinforce it. The sense of being (Seinssinn) of factual life remains broken (gebrochen) (GA61 155), in the sense that it at once makes impossible the interpretation that it makes possible as sense. Philosophical interpretation is impossible. But facticity and interpretation belong together in this “against”. The question is how a sense of belonging together, an “and”, can be hidden in the “against”. On the basis of a fundamental repetition (Wiederholung) of the lec-
tures of 1921-22, viz., those of 1929-30, I shall below pursue the “and” as an indication of “finitude”. It is not a question of balancing one course against another by measuring out similarities and differences. Any comparison belongs in the indifference of Vorhandenheit.

Considering the courses as different perspectives of the same thing, or as variations on a theme, is out of the question. Only in their diversity, their utter uniqueness as separate rock formations, are the courses echoes of one another, namely, in such a way that in this echo there appears what remains unsaid, which is what Heidegger writes against: the facticity in which they belong together.

2. “AND”

In the 1929-30 lecture course entitled Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik the fundamental mood of profound indifference (Langeweile) is evoked, namely, the profound indifference or boredom that is characteristic of us in our time; there is no appearance of an essential need, of an essential “Bedrängnis”, distress, with relation to being as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen) and to ourselves within it (GA29/30 244). This fundamental mood is evoked by pursuing the ambiguity that characterizes each mode of boredom in its own way, namely, that of being left behind empty (Leergelassenheit) and of remaining bound (Hingehaltenheit—note the reference to Halten and Gehalt in Hingehaltenheit). When we have missed a train at the station and are bored in the interim before the next train arrives, we are left behind empty, in the sense that our usual busi-ness in our contact with the surrounding entities can no longer engage us. But anyone who is left behind empty like this, as a result of the fact that the relevance of things has withdrawn, is at the same time bound in that boredom, bound not by the surrounding entities, but by the slowness of time unwilling to pass. The essence of the question is how being left empty, on the one hand, and being bound, on the other, are concerned with one another, how they are not just randomly coupled, but rather belong together in boredom, in the sense that they are joined (bezogen) together (GA29/30 162).

This question finds its sharpest intensification in the fundamental mood of profound boredom. The issue here is not being left behind empty by this or that entity, by this or that situation; it is being left behind empty by all entities, including our situation, including ourselves. In this state of profound boredom the indifference of all things, and of ourselves in their midst, is revealed. This indifference is not the outcome
of a sum of assessments, but overwhelms “us” all at once (GA29/30 208). It is essential
that this being left empty permeates everydayness as the levelled openness (Offen-
barkeit) of present objects in the widest sense.20

What emerges all at once in profound boredom is the emptiness that like a mist
shrouds the totality of entities as the whole of present objects. While expanding plan-
etary needs are all taken care of, a needlessness with relation to the whole manifests
itself; a Bedrängnis im Ganzen fails to come. For example, amidst the diversity of philo-
sophical problems and their solutions is hidden a fundamental senselessness of these
problems and their solutions. Philosophy masks this emptiness by throwing itself into
the accelerating mimetic reproduction of philosophical literature. In this literature,
philosophy passes by without touching being as a whole and without being affected by
it. Philosophy is part of human life as a pastime, as the battle against time, in which
fundamental boredom is vaulted over, and thereby reigns.

Essential in profound boredom is that, in being left empty, there emerges the indi-
cation of that which is masked by emptiness, that which embraces the whole of re-pre-
sented entities, the world—being as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen). This whole is not
a totality, but the dimension, the openness (Offenheit) reigning over the totality of pres-
ent objects and their representation. Where re-presentation progresses ever more in the
acceleration of itself, the world, the openness in which this happens, stays away.21 This
staying away of the world manifests itself as emptiness when profound boredom
emerges. But this emptiness is itself an indication that in the emptiness something stays
away: the weight of being encompassed by the world as the openness surrounding re-
presentation. The world reigns over the re-presentation; it takes re-presentation along
and therein stays away: “Alles je gerade zugängliche Seiende, uns selbst mit einbegriiffen, ist
von diesem Ganzen umgriffen. Wir selbst sind mit einbegriiffen in diesem ‘im Ganzen’.”
(“Every immediately accessible being, ourselves included, is encompassed by this whole.
We ourselves are also included in this ‘as a whole’…” (GA29/30 513). Only from the
heaviness of this being encompassed by the world can the indifference, the fundamental
boredom, of all representation be understood (GA29/30 515, cf. 208, 221).

When the emptiness of deep indifference is taken to its utmost limit, the world is
revealed. This revelation only takes place when the emptiness of indifference gives an
indication of its own nature: indifference is a denial. In boredom every possibility of
doing and acting is denied us. But—and here we are confronted with the crux of Hei-
degger’s interpretation—denial is a mode of speaking. In denial something is said. In
German: all Versagen (nay-saying) is still a mode of Sagen (saying).22
The profound indifference of all beings is a denial, and every denial is a mode of speaking, a paradoxical speaking that points to its own impossibility. When denial is an impossible mode of speaking, then there is also an im-possible answer to it: what is said by indifference is the impossibility of answering. When *Dasein* is confronted with this impossibility, it is confronted with the world. It is confined by a weight that denies it every possibility of acting or leaving alone. Here the emptiness (*Leergelassenheit*) is revealed as being bound by the weight of the world (*Hingehaltenheit*).

With this, a first indication has been found for the “and” as the juncture of leaving empty and keeping bound as the constituents of profound boredom. In profound boredom, emptiness first of all appears as the passing away of all entities in indifference. But in this emptiness what is concealed is the factum that the emptiness is a heaviness that keeps itself away, *abziehende Schwere*. Suddenly the emptiness of indifference turns out to be that which encloses every possibility: “…mit einem Mal ist alles von dieser Gleichgültigkeit umfangen und umhalten…[wir] finden uns inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen, d.h. im Ganzen dieser Gleichgültigkeit”. (“All at once everything is enveloped and constrained by this indifference… [we] find ourselves in the midst of being as a whole, in the whole of this indifference”) (GA29/30 208). Then emptiness and being bound are the same; emptiness is the hiding of being bound.

The question is: how can the weight of *Hingehaltenheit* be put into concepts? When Heidegger calls the fundamental-philosophical “concepts” *In-begriffe*, incepts, and in doing so indicates that they include (*begreifen in sich*) the whole of being, the point is that these “concepts” by their nature show how they belong in the midst of being as a whole, how they are enclosed by it. This can only happen when being as a whole itself becomes the measure of comprehending, becomes “die umfangende Grenze des Seienden im Ganzen”, “the enveloping limit of being as a whole” (GA29/30 217). Speaking must become the saying of being-enclosed itself.

When at this moment I try to point from and to *Hingehaltenheit*, this pointing itself is still pervaded with emptiness, the nebulosity of indifference. How can interpretation become concrete in tearing open this nebulosity? Only by an examination, which does not belong in a philosophical treatise in any sense, of the other side of philosophy’s inclusiveness, the side pointing to *Hingehaltenheit* in its proper sense, that *Dasein* is also included in these “concepts”.

In profound boredom everything that is characteristic of “us” is sucked away into indifference: name, status, profession, role, age and fate, mine and yours—all this ceases to have a grip upon us. We become an indifferent nobody (GA29/30 203); we are
“we” no more. Then even the “somebody” is lacking who is left behind empty in boredom; “nobody” is bored. This nobody whom indifference bypasses is called Dasein.

In the mood of profound indifference every possibility of existence is denied “somebody”. In this denial somebody is spoken to, somebody is summoned to exert “his/her” possibilities, but in the mode of denial. This denial as im-possibility points to Dasein in the proper sense: Dasein is this impossible possibility, the possibility that is denied. In the proper sense, Dasein is living up to this impossibility, i.e., to being bound in the weight of the surrounding world. Here it appears how the two senses of In-begriffe belong together. In-begriffe point to the inclusion of Dasein itself in the world that includes Dasein’s “concepts”.

Dasein becomes concrete, becomes its own self in utter loneliness, when it properly enters into the surrounding world as Hingehaltenheit. Dasein recognizes being enclosed in the world as its own possibility; it allows itself to be invited by this possibility of entering into the enclosure of the world. The world as enclosure is the source from which Dasein in the dispersion of representation has sprung away, and which conceals the invitation to spring back into it. The enclosure is what gives Dasein its possibility, das Ermöglichen, that which enables, possibilizes. Das Ermöglichen is not the possibility for Dasein to become this or that; rather the enclosure is Dasein’s own possibility: the possibility to return into its own confinement, its im-possibility.

This source of Dasein is a denial, and what Dasein is about is to let this denial speak, to let the enclosure of the world reign in the words that are used. Only then does it become clear what is meant by the analytic of Dasein, in contrast to analysis, which is always bound to representation. Analytic means comprehension (begreifen) as inclusion (einbegriffen) in the world, in the openness that is the enclosure of Dasein.

Hingehaltenheit in its proper sense consists in the return into the world as Dasein’s own possibility. Heidegger names Hingehaltenheit proper: the extreme point at which the eye is opened (die Spitze des Augenblicks). This extreme point is not a “moment” at which Dasein can elevate itself above its facticity, at which it can finally be fully present. This extreme point is a reinforcement of the enclosure of the world—otherwise it would be impossible to understand that this extremity is still called Hingehaltenheit. What happens in this intensification of Hingehaltenheit is that it itself gets into the possibility of speaking, namely, to Dasein as its own im-possibility.

Here it becomes clear what the “and” that pervades the analysis of indifference consists of. This “and” is the indication of a fundamental sameness. In the end, re-presentation is boredom that keeps itself away as pastime, boredom as emptiness is the
weight of the world keeping itself away, the world is the extreme point that opens the
eyes. How is this identity to be understood? How is it possible that representation in
the proper sense is pastime and therefore boredom, that boredom in the proper sense is
world, that world in the proper sense is the eye-opener? This possibility is there because
each time there is an “aspect” that stays away, but in this staying away it still holds sway
and cannot be removed.

This is the structure of the spell. A spell holds something or somebody and hides
itself in that hold. All traffic with represented entities (both in technique and in experi-
ence) is under the spell of boredom, as a pastime, the boredom that in turn is under the
spell of the world.29

When Dasein becomes proper, the same-ness of representation, pastime, world,
and eye-opener is revealed. How does this revelation take place? How does this same-
ness come into being? Here it appears that this “identity” itself is a fundamental bro-
kenness. Only when the spell is broken do representation, boredom, world, and eye-
opener turn out to be the same.30 Dasein becomes proper when it breaks the spell that
holds it; only then does the fundamental sameness manifest itself. Profound boredom
breaks the spell of representation, the world breaks the spell of emptiness, the opening
of the eye of Dasein breaks the spell of the world. Thanks simply to this break, the reign
of “against”, is it possible for “and” to arise as “the same”. Dasein's being proper lies in
this broken sameness:

Warum muß am Ende jene Weite des bannenden Horizontes gebrochen werden durch den Augen-
blick, und warum kann sie nur durch diesen gebrochen werden, so daß das Dasein gerade in
dieser Gebrochenheit zur eigentlichen Existenz kommt? Ist am Ende das Wesen der Einheit und
Fügung beider ein Bruch? Was meint diese Gebrochenheit des Daseins in sich selbst? (Why
must that breadth of the spellbinding horizon be broken in the end through the eye-opening
moment, and why can it be broken only through this such that precisely in this brokenness,
Dasein comes to proper existence? Is the essence of the unity and juncture of both ultimate-
ly a breach? What does this brokenness of Dasein in itself mean?) (GA29/30 252)

In the course Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik we are confronted with three fundamental
“concepts”: world (Welt), finitude (Endlichkeit), and individualization (Vereinzelung).
The question is: why just these three Grundbegriffe, and how are they bound together?
Thanks to the analytic of the “and” as broken identity, it is possible to reveal the inter-
connectedness of these “concepts”. The world is the openness surrounding Dasein, the
openness that gives all representation its boundary. The world as openness becomes proper openness when Dasein recognizes and accepts the weight of the world surrounding it as its own possibility. Then the world opens the eye of Dasein, and Dasein returns to this possibility. This return is only possible when every support from entities, from other people, and from the self has fallen away, when Dasein is thrown back upon itself, plunged into its extreme loneliness.

World and loneliness are revealed as being the same, but that revelation only takes place when the spell of the world is broken, at the moment when the eye of Dasein is opened. This brokenness of the same is what the most fundamental “concept” points to: finitude.31

With this, however, the final word has not been said. Even as broken identity, finitude remains pervaded with the abziehende Schwere of being away; brokenness and identity remain hidden, cannot truly reign.32 With respect to its own finitude Dasein is finite as well; it is always turned away from its broken identity—this concealment itself belongs to the character of finitude. The leap back to Dasein’s fundamental possibility is cut off, and even this concealment cannot be genuinely experienced. Dasein is an elevation that is at the same time carried away, concealed; it is fortnehmende Zukehr, a turning-to that takes away. The moment when Dasein’s eye is opened is also the moment when this “insight” disappears, and the spell is reinstated.33

There is the suspicion that Dasein’s enabling (das Ermöglichende) is an inexhaustible source, an overflow.34 Dasein’s attempt to answer this overflow is not equal to it; finite Dasein remains bound in its abziehende Schwere. Dasein’s spring back to its own source (Ursprung) always vaults over the impossibility of reaching it. Thus Dasein’s answer to this overflow is always excess, ubriV. As excess, Dasein is again and again thrown back upon its finitude. But now, in the epoch of fundamental boredom, even this problem of finitude and excess is indifferent.35 The indifference of Dasein’s finitude in the contemporary situation points to the fact that we, today, know of no enigma, of no secret (GA29/30 244). In this denial of the secret of finitude today lies the only indication of the nature of Dasein. In the never-ending progress of representation, as exemplified in philosophical literature, Dasein has to answer this denial, which is its only possibility.
NOTES


2 In GA61 169 Heidegger speaks of “eine Betrachtung, über die nicht weiter eine Diskussion eröffnet werden kann, wenn man sie verstanden hat, sondern die da ist, sofern sie sich konkret im Faktischen auswirkt”


4 GA 29/30 32: “Ist es denn so sicher, daß die Interpretation des menschlichen Daseins, in der wir uns heute bewegen – gemäß der z. B. die Philosophie ein sogenanntes Kulturgut neben anderen ist […] daß diese Interpretation des Daseins die höchste ist?” Compare GA56/57 131; GA61 41, 120, 169.

5 GA 61 174: “Die für die Seinssinnproblematik von Leben führende formale Anzeige des »ich bin« wird in der Weise methodisch wirksam, daß sie in ihren genuinen fakultativen Vollzug gebracht wird, d. h. in dem aufweisbaren Fragecharakter (»Unruhe«) des faktischen Lebens sich vollzieht als das konkrete historische Fragen: »bin ich« zu nehmen ist lediglich im Sinne des Hinzukommens auf mein konkretes faktisches Leben in seiner konkreten Welt”

6 GA 63 19: “Als was dagegen in dem so geführten Wachsein das Dasein ihm selbst begegnet, d. h. der Seinscharakter, ist nicht im vorhinein auszurechnen und nichts für die allgemeine Menschheit, nichts für ein Publikum, sondern er ist die bestimmte entscheidende Möglichkeit je der konkreten Faktizität.”

7 See also Was heißt Denken. 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971), p.164. What is Called Thinking?, translated by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 169: “No thinker has ever entered into another thinker’s solitude [Einsamkeit, also 'loneliness']. Yet it is only out of its solitude that any thinking speaks, in hidden fashion, to the thinking that follows or precedes it. What we represent and maintain to be the effects of a thinking are the misunderstandings to which it inevitably falls prey.”
The reading and writing that is no longer about Heidegger (by foregoing the thought that Heidegger’s work brings up philosophical contents) and takes the formal character of this thinking seriously (by following the idea that it exists only in the problem of the accessibility to thinking) was inaugurated by Van Dijk and then by Oudemans. See Th.C.W. Oudemans, “Heidegger’s logische Untersuchungen”, Heidegger Studies VI (1990): 85-105; and R.J.A. van Dijk, “Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik”, Heidegger Studies VII (1991): 89-109.

Re-presentation is “ein erkennendes Bestimmen, das in der Ausbildung des Ordnungsvorprozesses ständig seine eigene Möglichkeit sich ausbildet, von sich selbst her sich darauf einrichtet, daß es ständige und universale Bewegtheit sein kann.” (GA 63 62)

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An editorial word of caution is warranted at this point to avoid confusion between the frequently hyphenated “im-possibility” and straightforward “impossibility”. Im-possibility refers to the intertwining inner conflict and sameness between possibility and impossibility that Heidegger has uncovered in originary temporality (cf. SZ), the possible impossibility “and” impossible possibility that can never be fulfilled in a presence. This paradox of originary temporality points to the hidden dimension in this essay that is never mentioned therein, which is concerned with a formally indicative ex-hortatory discourse that seeks to say the traditionally unsayable [individuum est ineffabile] found at the extremity of solitude. For Heidegger, such an indexical discourse becomes possible because solitude (Einsamkeit) is at once a gathering (Sammeln: US 61), the very con-cretion of the taut extremes of originary temporality. (T. K.)

GA 63 64: “die Philosophie bietet dem Dasein objektiven Schutz, Aussicht auf die beruhigende Sicherheit der Übereinstimmung, die Herrlichkeit der Unmittelbarkeit der Lebensnähe, und in eins damit doch die Überwindung eines engbrüstigen detaillierten, langsam fortschleichenden, die großen Antworten abschiebenden Fragens. Die absolute »Bedürfnislosigkeit« (Hegel) ist erreicht”

14 GA 61 132: “Es ist nämlich nicht ohne weiteres ersichtlich, daß das sorgende Aufgehen eine Bewegung des Lebens »gegen sich« ist, so daß das Leben »noch« etwas anderes ist, welches andere in der Ruinanz zwar da ist, vorkommt, aber in der Weise des Abgedrängwerdens.”

15 “Sofern es sich aus dem Wege geht, ausdrücklich oder nicht, ist es gerade da.” (GA 61 106) “In every getting-out-of-the-way of itself, life is factically there for itself” (PIA 244).


17 GA 61 20: “Die Definitionsidée der »formalen« Logik ist hierin aufgehoben, und das schon deshalb, weil diese Definitionsidée und die »formale« Logik gar nicht »formale« sind, sondern immer wesentlich von einer materialen Gegenstandregion (Sachen, Lebens, Bedeutsames) und deren bestimmter kenntnismäßiger Erfassungstendenz (ordnendes Sammeln) her orientierenden »logischen« Problematik entspringen.”

18 GA 63 16: “»Begriff« ist kein Schema, sondern eine Möglichkeit des Seins, des Augenblicks, bzw. augenblickskonstitutiv; eine geschöpfte Bedeutung; zeigt Vorhabe, d. h. ver- setzt in Grunderfahrung; zeigt Vorgriff, d. h. verlangt ein Wie des Ansprechens und Befragens; d. h. versetzt in das Dasein nach seiner Auslegungstendenz und Bekümmerung. Grundbegriffe sind keine Nachträglichkeiten, sondern vor-tragend: Dasein in den Griff nehmen in ihrer Weise.”

19 Compare GA 24 297: “Es sind nicht zunächst Wörter da, die zu Zeichen für Bedeutungen gestempelt werden, sondern umgekehrt, aus dem sich selbst und die Welt verstehenden Dasein, d. h. aus einem schon enthüllten Bedeutungszusammenhang heraus wächst diesen Bedeutungen je ein Wort zu. Die Wörter können, wenn sie in dem gefaßt werden, was sie ihrem Wesen nach besagen, nie als freischwebende Dinge genommen werden.” Compare also GA29/30 445f.

21 GA 29/30 504: “der vulgäre Verstand sieht vor lauter Seiendem die Welt nicht […] jene Unterschiedlosigkeit, in der er alles Seiende hält, das ihm in den Weg läuft, diese Unterschiedlosigkeit im Verhalten zum Seienden ist – selbst in Tieferem verwurzelt – mit ein Grund für dieses Nicht-sehen der Welt.”

22 GA 29/30 211: “Die Langeweile und ihre Leergelassenheit besteht hier in der Ausgeliefertheit an das sich im Ganzen versagende Seiende. Was liegt darin, daß das Seiende im Ganzen die Möglichkeiten des Tuns und Lassens für ein Da-sein inmitten seiner versagt? Alles Versagen ist in sich ein Sagen, d. h. Offenbarmachen.”

23 GA 29/30 8: “…they are concepts of a unique sort. In each case they include the whole, they are incepts. But they are incepts in a second sense which is just as essential and connected with the first sense; in each case they always include the human being that does the including along with its Dasein.”


25 GA 29/30 216: “Das sich im Ganzen versagende Seiende sagt nicht beliebige Möglichkeiten meiner selbst an, berichtet nicht darüber, sondern dieses Ansagen im Versagen ist ein Anrufen, das eigentliche Ermöglichende des Daseins in mir.”

26 GA 29/30 215-16: “Was eine Möglichkeit aber als solche angeht, das ist das sie Ermöglichende, was ihr selbst als diesem Möglichen die Möglichkeit verleiht. Dieses Äußern und Erste, alle Möglichkeiten des Daseins als Möglichkeiten Ermöglichende, dieses, was das Seinkönnen des Daseins, seine Möglichkeiten trägt, ist von dem sich im Ganzen versagenden Seienden betroffen.”


28 Heidegger speaks of “Das ansagende Hinweisen auf das, was das Dasein in seiner Möglichkeit eigentlich ermöglicht, ist ein Hinzwingen auf die einzige Spitze dieses ursprünglichen Ermöglichen den.” (GA 29/30 216)
GA29/30 211: “But this withdrawal [Entzug] of entities that shows itself in entities is only possible when Dasein as such can no longer go on, is spellbound as Da-sein, as being-there, and indeed as a whole. Thus that which holds open being as a whole and makes it at all accessible as such,... precisely this must simultaneously bind [binden] Dasein to itself, spellbind [bannen] it.”

30 The point is “um den Bann jener Not – der Not des Ausbleibens der Bedrängnis im Ganzen – zu brechen, d. h. um jener tiefen Not überhaupt erst einmal gewachsen und für sie offen zu sein, um sie als bedrängende wahrhaft zu erfahren?” (GA 29/30 246)


33 GA 29/30 428: “dieses Zurück in die Uneigentlichkeit ist das Verlöschen des Augenblicks, welches Verlöschen nicht aus irgendwelchen äußeren Ursachen schließlich eintritt, sondern in der Augenblicklichkeit des Augenblicks wesenhaft begründet ist.”

34 Dasein suspects, regarding its source, “daß ihre Problematik so ist, daß dieses Urspringen entquillt, d. h. im Zustand der Lebendigkeit ständigen Entquellens sich hält, gehalten wird, der Abfall zurückgewagt wird!” (GA 61 194)