

CHAPTER EIGHT

TRAGEDY AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS

8.0. Introduction

In the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to show how radically the cosmology of the *Antigone* differs from modern European modes of thinking and living. To this end we have tried to distance ourselves from our separative cosmology. However, we realize that this distance is relative in more than one respect. First of all, it is impossible to transcend one's cosmology in such a way that one shares the life of the other. In a sense, interpretations are lifeless. They are of a partly formal and empty character. Secondly, it is impossible to transcend the bounds of one's language. We had to strain separative language in order to approximate the ambiguities and contradictions of the *Antigone*. At best, the result of our interpretations is that we have pointed out gaps in our cosmological building. It is absurd to pretend that we are able to fill them. We can point out the fact that Zeus and Eros have no place in our cosmology, but we are unable to live under their sway, even if it were desirable—an unanswerable question.

Yet the otherness of a tragedy which is one of the pillars of our culture is interesting enough. It may occasion the suspicion that our culture lives on an intrinsically conflicting cosmological basis, while it is its cosmology's very nature that all contradictions should be removed or assimilated. The awkward relationship between our cosmology and the *Antigone*, which belongs to its core and yet remains totally foreign to it, is strikingly clear from the history of philosophy.

For centuries philosophers have referred to the battle between philosophy and tragedy. Plato mentions their "ancient strife." That the war is not over may be gathered from remarks by Nietzsche and Ricœur. The former speaks of "an eternal struggle between the theoretical and the tragic world view." Ricœur's conception is even more radical. In his eyes, tragedy is anti-philosophy (SM 107). It is an insupportable revelation, unacceptable to thinking (SM 200). According to Ricœur, philosophy cannot reaffirm tragedy as such without committing suicide (CI 305). In this chapter we will ask what the nature of this never-ending war may be.

The father of metaphysics, Plato, was fully cognizant of the whole range of differences between the tragic cosmology he partly belonged to

and the new cosmology of separatism which he advocated in certain fundamental respects. It was not moral censorship which compelled him to exorcize tragedy, but the fact that for cosmologies the times had changed. The rise of separative cosmology necessitated the banishment of tragedy. This banishment was so successful that Aristotle could reintroduce tragedy to the polis after it had been separated from its interconnected nature and had been reduced to the specific realm of art as pleasurable entertainment.

The separation between philosophy and tragedy as a form of art has been so successful that for centuries modern philosophy could afford to leave tragedy outside its range of questions. For example, from the philosophies of Descartes and Kant tragedy is virtually absent. With the rise of Hegel's philosophy, (belonging to a specific cultural context we cannot go into here), separative cosmology made a sharp and surprising turn. Hegel reintroduced one aspect of interconnectedness into metaphysics: the existence and development of genuine contradictions in a reality which is internally divided. The consequences of this metamorphosis, which still exerts its influence, have been enormous. Tragedy, and especially the *Antigone*, was readmitted into the heart of philosophy. This constitutes a challenge to philosophy's separatism which has not yet been answered. Small wonder that since Hegel hardly any philosopher of repute has been able to disregard Greek tragedy. The tenets of separatism and the genuine contradictions of tragedy demand a reconciliation.

Since the rise of Hegel's philosophy metaphysicists have been unable to exorcize tragedy according to Plato's example. They try to account for it and incorporate it into philosophy or into a transformation of philosophy. Yet philosophy is indissolubly bound to separative cosmology, so that any attempt at reconciling philosophy and tragedy will be an assimilation leaving aside as a by-product something that was tragedy's very essence in the context of interconnectedness. Hegel, for example, accounted for genuine contradictions—but his *Antigone* has been separated from all ties with pollution, ritual and ambiguity. And he tried to surmount tragic conflict by a reconciliation on a higher level. Those philosophers who have tried to account for pollution and ambiguity in Hegel's vein, for example Ricœur, have been unable to do so without banishing some of tragedy's interconnected aspects.

A totally new challenge to European cosmology was constituted by the philosophy of Nietzsche. After Plato he was the first to bring philosophy into contact with the dreadful ambiguity of Dionysian power. In Nietzsche's wake the *Antigone* has been given a central place in philosophy by Heidegger and Derrida. In these philosophies, the problem of har-

monization between philosophy and tragedy crops up in various ways, without any trace of a solution. It is our conclusion that there is no harmony between philosophy and tragedy. It is impossible both to reject the *Antigone* and to adopt it within European cosmology.

8.1. Plato's banishment of tragedy

In our days it has become quite fashionable to pass moral judgment on Plato's attitude with respect to tragedy. Either Plato is easily condemned from an enlightened democratic point of view as a philosopher who acts like a censor and a puritan, or he is praised for the 'courage' of his ethical convictions (Shorey IR lxiii). These moral judgments tend to obscure the fundamental questions at stake. They release the judges from the obligation to ask whether Plato was not bowing to cosmological necessity when he banished tragedy and whether this banishment was not so deep-rooted that it continues to determine Western thought, especially moral judgment. Therefore we agree with Goldschmidt when he maintains that the professed 'immorality' of the tragedians does not suffice to explain Plato's hostility towards them, but that the issue is a matter of truth (QP 136).

If we wish to understand Plato's attitude to tragedy we have to take seriously his own professed reason for banishing unsuitable poetry from the polis and only accepting poetry which has been purified. What Plato says is: "For the logos constrained us" (ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἥρει). *Logos*, and not some ethical prejudice, forced Plato to take a stand which he could not change. In his own words, it was impossible for him to betray what he saw as the truth (Rep 607c). The *logos* taking hold of Plato is the logic of separation. This logic was not inaugurated by Plato or by anyone else; it is part of the cosmology of separation in which Plato partook. Before discussing the other categories of this cosmology (confining ourselves to the context of Plato's treatment of poetry in the *Republic*), we shall look at the category of insight, because this will clarify the nature of this separative *logos*.

In chapter 3 we referred to that fundamental event in Greek philosophy: the introduction of the principle of non-contradiction as the basis of the separation of consistent truth from changeable opinion (cf. Detienne MV 124,). For Plato, this is the kernel of real insight, contrary to the sphere of phenomena. Truth is separated from illusion, because truth cannot consist of contradictory statements on one and the same subject (de Rijks PS 330-32): "Did we not maintain that it is impossible for the same person to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing at the same time?" (Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταῦτα ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον

εἶναι; - 602e, cf. 436b). According to Plato's philosophy, self-contradiction should be excluded not only from statements on reality but from the human soul as well. If there are contradictory movements in a man concerning the same thing, there must be two things in him (604b). As soon as there seems to be a real contradiction in functions of the soul, we know that there was more than one thing functioning (436b).

The separation of truth from appearance is essential in Plato's philosophy, because only the truth of the *eidos* guarantees an unimpaired identity in what is known. Only then can we guarantee that known reality always remains the same, is not composite (*asuntheton*), is unalterable. Reality as it shows itself in appearances should be rejected, because it threatens the purity of knowledge. In appearance the same object may seem to be bent or straight, concave or convex, according to whether it is in or out of the water (602c). Appearance therefore is disorder and self-contradiction, which should be mastered by true insight.

The separation of truth from appearance is not presented to us on a salver. At the outset, the situation is one of an intermingling of truth and appearance. Appearances are like illnesses, time and again intruding upon the purity of the soul. Therefore philosophy, being an endeavour to reach the order of pure identity, is primarily to be used as a medicine, a remedy against the dangers of the intrusion of appearance. Only after a pharmaceutic operation of separation is it possible to regard the realms of good and evil, truth and falsehood, essence and appearance, inside and outside, as being really exterior to each other. Philosophy is medicine as much as it is pure knowledge (Derrida Diss 117).

This is what Timaeus maintains at the beginning of the *Critias*. He hopes that he has spoken according to measure (μετρίως), and not out of tune (παρὰ μέλος). And he adds that knowledge is the best drug (ἄριστον φαρμάκων) against that danger. We shall return to Plato's use of the essentially ambiguous word *pharmakon* in this context, which has been meticulously elaborated by Derrida.

The cosmological necessity of keeping the unclear, the changeable, the contradictory outside the realm of knowledge, if knowledge is to retain its essence: unchangeable truth—that is the *rationale* of Plato's banishment of tragedy. Tragedy threatens separative order. Therefore philosophy has to act as a drug against this polluting power—a purifying drug. This is stated explicitly at the beginning of the tenth book of the *Republic*:

That kind [of imitative art] seems to be a pollution (λώβη) of the mind of all listeners who do not possess the remedy (φάρμακον): knowing (τὸ εἰδέναι) how it [i.e. imitative art] really is. (Rep 595b)

Plato's aim is the aim of philosophy in general: to ensure that not appearance (τὸ φαινόμενον) should be master in us (ἄρχειν), but rationality

(τοῦ λογιστικοῦ - 602e). Because Plato's description of tragedy is quite adequate—he emphasizes its changing and self-contradictory nature—it is reasonable that he should endeavour to separate it from human minds too easily seduced by its emotions and confusion.

Plato sees tragedians as imitators, even as imitators squared: they are concerned with appearances of appearances (602b). Small wonder then that the world of tragedians is extremely unstable, as is apparent even in the dangerous language they employ. They use concepts which are awesome (δεινὰ) and fearsome (φοβερά). By means of these concepts they appeal to man's confused and confusing emotions: they send shudders through their audience (387b-c). These appeals to emotion are dangerous, because only too soon this pollution spreads to the rational part of the soul. Though the rich vocabulary of the poets is only a superficial colouring, it casts a spell (κῆλησιν) over the audience (601b). As a result tragic statements are just emotional persuasion. In order not to be deceived by this deceitful clothing the words of tragedians have to be stripped bare (γυμνωθέντα) (601b), i.e. they have to be purified. All human beings are acquainted with the struggle between the irrational and the rational parts of the soul. In order to avoid this struggle, man has to master the inferior part by his calculating abilities. Then the self-contradiction of the inferior part itself is avoided as well. The fundamental flaw of mimetic art is that it unduly stresses the inferior part of the soul, thereby jeopardizing rationality. Tragedy causes self-contradiction to go on reigning supreme. On the one hand Plato denounces the real oppositions within man as depicted in mimetic art:

Is, then, a man in all this of one mind with himself (ὁμονοητικῶς)? Or is it the case, just as he combated himself (ἐστασίαιεν) with respect to seeing and held within himself opposing (ἐναντίας) opinions about the same thing, that also in his actions he is divided against himself (στασίαιζει) and is fighting with himself (μάχεται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ)? (603c/d)

On the other hand Plato refers to tragic persons not only as being in contradiction with themselves but as being many-coloured, diversified, double-edged (ποικίλον—605a) as well. Such self-contradictory and ambiguous people are dangerous. They threaten the highest part of the soul which contemplates unchangeable truth. To be able to contemplate truth the soul itself has to be constant, it has to remain as much identical with itself as possible. Only in such a stable condition is it able to make the necessary clear distinctions between truth and falsehood, between justice and injustice (611c).

As might have been expected, Plato's separation of philosophy from imitative poetry is no isolated phenomenon. This separation extends

through the whole of his cosmology in a series of transformations. First of all, by transformation, his division of the soul into an emotional and a rational part is at the same time a division between nature and culture. In the symbolic representation of the soul in the *Republic* book IX the lower parts are represented by a many-headed monster and a lion, whereas the higher, rational part is represented by a human being. A truly rational person will give his truly human qualities complete domination over the monstrous and bestial aspects. Thereupon we are confronted with a familiar agricultural metaphor: rational man will take charge of the monster, like a farmer who will cherish and train the cultivated plants (ἡμερα), but will check the growth of the wild ones (ἄγρια) (589b).

As in the Egyptian example of the garden tree the separation between nature and culture is endangered by a basic ambiguity. Wildness cannot be completely separated from the cultivated garden. Its inordinate growth has to be checked continuously. Analogously, rational man is basically and persistently possessed by wild forces which, if unchecked, overgrow his rationality. Certainly the rational are just and as such tame (ἡμερος), not wild (Gorg 516c). But before that situation can be reached the primordial wildness must be banished, otherwise a really tragic situation will set in: the beast and the lion will dominate and starve the human being, while they cannot be reconciled to each other either. They "bite, devour and fight" each other (589a). In the light of this danger of wildness it is understandable that Plato should consider the conjunction of the soul with the animal-like body a pollution from which the soul must be purified:

But to know its [i.e. the soul's] true nature we must view it unpolluted (λελωβημένον) by communion with the body and other evils as we now contemplate it, but we have to examine it adequately in the light of reason, what it is when it is purified (καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον). (611c)

This statement presupposes that there is a primordial communion of body and soul, a state of undistinguished impurity.

In the light of the necessary cosmological separation of nature and culture it is inevitable that tragedy is banished. Tragedy is emphatically concerned with just this realm of the bestial and the vegetal. Tragedians are gardeners who let their garden be overgrown with wild plants. Poetic mimesis "breeds" (τρέφει) wild feelings, "irrigating" them (ἄρδουσα), whereas from the point of view of rationality they should be "parched" (αὐχμεῖν) (606d). It is clear that tragedy fosters the forces of wild nature when it compares heroes like Agamemnon, who should be supremely human, to low animals. Plato attacks the description of the leaders of

Greece in a terminology taken from nature, as in Il 1.225: "with thy eyes of a dog and the heart of a fleet deer" (Rep 390a).

Through a well-known transformation, Plato's logic of separation extends to the gods. To Plato the poetic image of anthropomorphic gods is dangerous. This is understandable if we take into consideration that man's highest part is unchangeable and rational, but at the same time divine (611e). If man's higher part is divine on a microscopic scale, then the divine on a macroscopic scale will be equally unchangeable, and completely unlike phenomenal variety. The kernel of divine existence is that it should not be changeable but at one with itself (ἀπλοῦν - 380d). Least of all should the god be many-shaped (ἥκιστα ἂν πολλὰς μορφαίς ἵσχοι ὁ θεός - 381b). The god cannot even desire to change himself (381c). In the light of the necessary singleness of divinity, all its other aspects are understandable. The gods should not commit injustice and not create strife amongst each other (378b). They can only be held responsible for good things, not for bad things (379b), and they cannot be fraudulent.

That this separation of the gods from all that is changeable is a pharmaceutic activity is conspicuous when Plato maintains that the gods, being essentially good, are not responsible for many things in the world (379c). Apparently there are forces which have more influence than the gods, forces from which the gods have to be separated. It is interesting to note that the superhuman nature of the divine implies a distancing (analogous to that of the Cartesian God) between man and the divine. Gods cannot be moved by gifts from mortals (390e) and they do not send deceiving signs which might be interpreted mantically (382e/383a). The most important point is that the gods are not jealous. If they lead man into destruction, that is merely just punishment (380b).

Through this procedure of separation of man and the divine, Plato is able to avert human hubris. On the one hand he is convinced that man's divine part can be separated from his lower parts. On the other hand he is certain that the gods will not punish man if he tries to be god-like. Therefore Plato is able with impunity to exhort men to become god-like (θεῖοι) in so far as that is humanly feasible (383c, 613a, cf. Aristotle EN 1178a22). And thus the problem of ambiguous tragic erring, caused by the malevolence of the gods, is precluded. Man can only impose the guilt for his evil deeds upon himself. He should not blame the gods for his iniquities. Thus the notion of tragic erring has lost its sting.

Again it is no more than consistent that Plato should reject the intrusion of 'hybrid' heroes into the polis. Such heroes are mixtures of god-like and animal-like characteristics, and as such are dangerous:

Nor will we suffer our youth to believe that Achilles [...] was so full of confusion (ταραχῆς), that he had two contradictory (ἐναντίω ἀλλήλοις) maladies

in himself, servility because of greed and at the same time arrogance (ὑπερηφανίαν) towards gods and men. (391c)

By another transformation Plato's cosmology has to expel the emotional dangers which surround fundamental human social relations. Rational, godlike man should be as unchangeable as possible, implying that he should not be marred by disturbing emotions and passions. He should possess as much endurance of such disturbances as possible. This state of independence, of self-sufficiency, is especially needed in social ties, whose severance too often produces emotional disturbances. Such social atomism is characteristic of separative cosmology. Self-sufficiency is the hall-mark of rational man. Therefore rational man is as independent of others as possible. He "is most of all men sufficient unto himself (αὐτάρκης) for living rightly, and differs from others in having least need of anybody else" (387d-e). Only by self-sufficiency can the disturbance of emotions caused by the loss of a family member or friend be averted. The rational power of endurance is medicine against the disturbing power of suffering. Rational man therefore bears up with modesty when fate overtakes him (387e). Thanks to philosophical pharmacy, emotional ties like those of Creon and Antigone no longer affect rational man. For him it has become bearable to lose a family member: "Least of all then to him it is awesome (δεινόν) to lose a son or a brother" (387e, cf. 603e). It is a logical consequence that Plato should be opposed to the tears and lamentations of tragic heroes and that he should call mimetic art a foul woman having intercourse (ξυγγιγνομένη) with a foul man, engendering foul offspring (603b).

By another transformation, death can lose its awesomeness as well. First of all, in the light of his self-sufficiency, rational man will fear death least of all (386a-b). And in the second place the fear of death is unnecessary because, in so far as it constitutes a unity with itself and as such is godlike, the soul will be as immortal as the gods (611b,e). Small wonder that Socrates can take his departure from life "with fair hope, serene and well content when the end comes" (496e). Like Antigone at the beginning of Sophocles' tragedy, Plato believes that death should be praised (386a-b), but he would severely condemn her reversal in the *kommos* when she starts lamenting her impending doom. Anybody bewailing his fate when he has to leave life unwillingly is despised by Plato as giving a bad example (386d). Again it is only by a therapeutical procedure of separation that the danger of an intermingling of life and death is banished. Rational law is needed against the "shameless greed of living" (Crito 53e). Apparently this force of life is primordial, and only by philosophy's medicine can it be checked.

Finally, it is evident that Plato does not accept any ambiguity in the law of talion:

We are going to say that so it is that both poets and writers of prose speak wrongly about men in matters of greatest moment, saying that there are many examples of men who, though unjust, are happy, and of just men who are wretched, and that there is profit in injustice if it be concealed, and that justice is the other man's good and your own loss; and I presume that we shall forbid them to say this sort of thing and command them to sing and fable the opposite. (392a-b)

The banishment of poetry is an inevitable prerequisite to attain the purity of separative cosmology. This point may clarify the position of ambiguity in separative cosmology. To Plato the separation of truth and appearance, of the unchangeable just person and the variegated tragic person, of ratio and emotion, does not come first. A prior necessary move is a therapeutical procedure of banishing. The forest of unclarity has to be cleared in order to reap the pure harvest of rationality. Philosophy is therefore first of all "banishing threnody by therapy" (ιατρικὴ θρηνηδίαν ἀφανίζοντα — 604d). Before this procedure, the boundaries between rationality and tragic spell are not settled. Even after the separation of tragedy and rationality the former is still a threat to order. The question is: how is it possible that tragedy is still able to cast a spell which might contaminate rational man and the well-ordered polis? Is it not reasonable to suppose that rational order is preceded by and permeated with ambiguous power? Separative cosmology rests on an ambiguous power which has to be banished before purity can be reached, but which cannot be expelled forever. As Derrida renders it in his interpretation of Plato's pharmacy:

The purity of the inside can then only be restored if the *charges are brought home* against exteriority as a supplement, inessential yet harmful to the essence [...] it is thus necessary to put the outside back in its place. To keep the outside out. This is the inaugural gesture of "logic" itself, of good "sense" insofar as it accords with the self-identity of *that which is* [...]. The cure by *logos*, exorcism and catharsis, will thus eliminate the excess. (Diss 128)(Fr Diss 147)

Derrida has argued convincingly that, if it is to be effective, the medicine of philosophy will have to share aspects of the illness it banishes. Up to a certain point the medicine has to be homeopathic. It has to use the self-same ambiguous power that it banishes. Philosophy is a drug, a *pharmakon*. But as such it is opposed to another *pharmakon* (or, in an ambiguous sense, the same *pharmakon*): the poisonous drug of tragedy. Then the ambiguity of pharmaceutical power is primary, and philosophy has to make use of the same ambiguity which it subsequently expels.

Ontological knowledge becomes a pharmaceutical force opposed to another pharmaceutical force. The order of knowledge is not the transparent order of forms and ideas, as one might be tempted retrospectively to interpret it; it is the antidote. Long before being divided up into occult violence and accurate knowledge, the element of the *pharmakon* is the combat zone between philosophy and its other. An element that is in itself, if one can still say so, *undecidable*. (Diss 138) (Fr. Diss.158)

In its attack on tragedy, philosophy has to expel something of its own ambiguous basis. But is not that exactly the situation we have described as the tragic predicament? In order to establish culture, an ambiguous hero has to employ his power, but the resulting order has to make him a scapegoat, because his power is an undermining pollution. In a sense, Plato's pharmacy is a quasi-ritual effort to control ambiguity. The specificity of separative cosmology is not that it does not subsist on ambiguity, but that it can only subsist if the first separation within ambiguity is followed by a second, if the initial banishing therapy is separated from the consequent purity of order. Only then will all traces of ambiguity have been removed. This second banishment, a throwing away of the ladder to purity, consists of a process of *forgetting* the initial banishment in an exclusive emphasis on clarity. In interconnected cosmology there is also a continuing activity in order to control ambiguity by separation and expulsion, but there a total expulsion of ambiguity is never achieved. It returns time and again. It is never totally controlled by procedures of separation, which therefore never end. Myths, rites and tragedy have to be repeated *ad infinitum*, because they do not totally succeed as pharmaceutic measures.

In a sense, Plato is very close to tragic ambiguity. His banishment of tragedy shows that he is alive to its undermining dangers. One might say that his banishment of tragedy is not complete, because he is haunted by the fear of its renewed intrusion; he is not able to forget tragedy. This second banishment succeeds in the philosophy of Aristotle. It is interesting to note that in Plato's philosophy another aspect of the ambiguity of *pharmaka* is recognized. There is the ambiguity of the poison of tragedy, which has to be counteracted by the counter-poison of philosophy, but the emotional drug of tragedy itself is ambiguous as well. Sometimes emotional discharges which are comparable to the tragic are considered by Plato not as poisons but as medicines, as cathartic drugs. In the *Leges* he describes the Dionysiac enthusiasm and he sees it as an external motion which may overpower internal motions (emotions) of fear and frenzy (φοβερὰν καὶ μανικὴν — Leg 791a). But this emotional overpowering of emotions is not an even more dangerous poison; it has the reverse effect. By overpowering (κατῆσασα) the emotions, it brings calm

to the soul, like a homeopathic medicine. Of this emotional power Plato says:

The Bacchants, who are awake, it brings into a sound state of mind (ἐξαις ἔμφονας) instead of frenzy (ἀντὶ μανικῶν), by means of dancing and playing, with the help of whatsoever gods they chance to be worshipping with sacrifice. (Leg 791a-b)

In Bacchic ritual the Dionysian frenzy, which is a poison when employed in tragedy, is at the same time a homeopathic therapy.

What happens in Aristotle's account of poetry is that this curative effect of Bacchic frenzy, which is recognized by Plato with respect to ritual, is extended to tragedy. Just like Plato, Aristotle is convinced that tragedy influences the emotional part of the soul in movements of pity, fear and enthusiasm. According to Aristotle's *Politica*, such *pathemata* are disturbances (Pol 1341a17ff). In tragedy these emotions are stirred once more, but in this case the effect is thought to be curative. The spectators are purified of the disturbance of these emotions by homeopathic therapy. Contrary to Plato, Aristotle believes that a confrontation with tragedy enhances the citizens' emotional stability (cf. Pol 1342a). Tragic catharsis is a control of ambiguous emotional power strengthening man's resistance to the emotional trials of real life (Lucas AP 283). (Of course this medicinal theory has ritual aspects – Parker M 288-89).

Plato and Aristotle seem to emphasize opposite aspects of the drug tragedy, but this parallelism is only apparent. Aristotle was able to forget the dangerous power of tragedy thanks to his separation of tragedy from danger and its confinement to the category of health-producing drugs. On the basis of this secondary banishment Aristotle was able to consider tragedy an innocent source of pleasure devoid of cosmological significance. "Aristote est au-delà de la crise tragique" (Girard VS 405).¹

To Plato, tragedy was dangerous because it threatened to undermine morality and pedagogy. To him, tragedy was cosmologically relevant. To Aristotle, it was possible to acclaim tragedy as a pleasant medicine, because he had banished tragedy from the sphere of religion, ethics and pedagogy, in short, from cosmology. This is conspicuous in his description of various types of music (Pol 1341a21ff., 1341b32-1342a29). Aristotle classifies music as three types: ethical melodies, melodies of action and passionate melodies. Only the ethical melodies are to be used in educa-

¹ As regards Aristotle's claim that tragedy is more philosophic than history (Poet 1451b4ff.), we agree with Lucas: "The question why god allows iniquities is not answered, or even asked, by tragedy as A[ristotle] understands it. Accordingly many may think that his claim that tragedy is philosophic does not amount to much" (AP 120).

tion, the others are merely useful for listening to while others are performing. Only the latter types belong to tragedy. Such types of music act as drugs. Their effect on emotional people, who are easily influenced by fear, pity and enthusiasm, is that they are "thrown into a state as if they had received medical treatment and a 'catharsis.'" But for Aristotle this catharsis is purely a matter of action and passion, *it is not ethical*:

All [emotional people] must undergo a "catharsis" and a pleasant feeling of relief; and similarly also the "cathartic" melodies afford harmless delight to people. Therefore those who go in for theatrical music must be set to compete in harmonies and melodies of this kind [...] but for education, as had been said, the ethical class of melodies and of harmonies must be employed. (Pol 1342a14ff.)

We agree with Guépin when he maintains that in this separation of theatrical music from all ethical matters Aristotle is engaging in polemics with Plato (TP 219). And there is no reason why the same should not hold true for his conception of tragic catharsis in general. In so far as tragedy is catharsis, it is a "harmless delight" and cosmologically irrelevant.

By this banishment of tragedy from the sphere of ethics and cosmology, Aristotle finally exorcized Plato's fear of tragedy. As a result, tragedy could return to the city without harm. It was reduced to *divertissement*. Aristotle is not only the father of literary criticism which concerns the domain of aesthetics as distinct from philosophy and science, he is also the father of the modern stage, which is irrevocably dependent upon Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics as a pleasurable entertainment, separated from philosophy and cosmology.

8.2. Ricœur's reconciliation of tragedy and philosophy

In chapter 5 we pointed out the extraordinary depth of Hegel's interpretation of the *Antigone*. We saw how he revealed the mirroring tragic errings of both Antigone and Creon in their inescapable one-sidedness. Hegel also remarked how deeds in themselves engender contradiction (*Entzweiung, Trennung*) and thereby tragic guilt. Finally, Hegel emphasized how in the end the tragic protagonists undergo a reversal in acknowledging their tragic guilt. All this emphasis on dividedness has not prevented Hegel from maintaining that the ultimate outcome of the tragedy, in spite of the destruction of individuals and "sittliche Mächte," is absolute justice, a state of higher harmony, in which the previous opposition is surpassed and retained (*aufgehoben*) at the same time: "Erst in der gleichen Unterwerfung beider Seiten ist das absolute Recht vollbracht" (PG 337).

Here we must ask what the nature of the *Aufhebung* and of absolute justice consists of. We have to realize that this final reconciliation is not a harmony without residue. The "submission" of both sides of Antigone and Creon is also the protagonists' destruction. They have to be sacrificed in order to reach the higher stage. Hegel's dialectics resemble a procedure of controlled ambiguity. As in the case of every other ambiguous ritual, the adjustment it brings about can also be considered a violent expulsion. In this context Derrida points to the opposite of the idea of *Aufhebung* as the outcome of the *Antigone* (GI 188).² From the point of view of tragic cosmology the position of Creon and Antigone should be reread, not only as the victory of absolute justice, but also as the ineradicable duality of human disorder and divine order. For Dionysiac logic there is no harmony and no solving of contradictions in any phase of development. It reveals the coexistence of order and disorder (Segal DP 286-87).

In the twentieth century it was Ricœur who made a renewed attempt to reconcile philosophy and tragedy in a higher harmony, though his claims are much more modest than Hegel's. He merely hopes for a reconciliation in an eschatological expectation. On the other hand, Ricœur has faced one aspect of interconnectedness which had no prominent place in Hegel's philosophy: pollution. It is interesting to see how Ricœur introduced pollution into philosophy and whether his attempt at harmonizing them left a residue which could not be incorporated into the new unity.

In *La symbolique du mal* we witness a confrontation of tragic cosmology with Jewish and Christian thought regarding one central theme: the place of evil in cosmology. Ricœur approaches the cosmology of evil on two levels of symbolism. The first is that of symbols *sensu stricto*: opaque signs in which divergent superimposed (interconnected) meanings shine through (SM 21-24). According to Ricœur, the primary symbols of evil are pollution, sin, and guilt. He traces an evolution in which each stage of symbolism is "surpassed" by the next, but the lower stages are "retained" at the next stage in a higher harmony.

The second level of symbolism is reached when symbols are developed in a story employing them in a specific time and space (SM 25, 153-54). Ricœur compares four myths concerning the origin and the end of evil. Two of them are relevant to us: the tragic myth of the evil deity and the Adamic myth. Before we try to interpret Ricœur's ideas concerning sym-

² "La logique de l'*Aufhebung* se retourne à chaque instant dans son autre absolu. L'appropriation absolue est l'expropriation absolue. L'onto-logique peut toujours être relue ou réécrite comme logique de la perte ou de la dépense sans réserve" (GI 188).

bolism and the myths of evil, we have to ascertain what he means when he speaks of an evolution of symbols and myths.

When Ricœur refers to a "stage" of symbolism of myth which has been superseded by the next, he is not speaking of the abolition of the previous state but of a "mediated sublimation" (SM 49) by which it is preserved at the higher stage. That means that the lower stage is "reaffirmed" at the higher one (SM 73).

In this context evolution should not be regarded as a temporal phenomenon but as a structural one. The symbolism of a culture may be more 'archaic' than a comparable symbolism in another culture, which nevertheless precedes the former by as much as a millennium (SM 59). Transitions from one stage to another occur time and again (SM 51).

Finally it should be realized that evolution is not progress *tout court*. A subsequent stage may prove to be a loss as well as a gain (CI 287). Yet this consideration has not caused Ricœur to drop the terminology of evolution and merely to speak of cosmological variations, implying that, despite occasional losses, the subsequent stages are higher or richer than the preceding.

Of course, Ricœur too interprets pollution not as consisting of "literal" dirt, but as something "symbolic" (SM 41), but he sees the sphere of the symbolic as a secondary superposition on the literal (SM 146, CI 285), while in our eyes the opposite is true: the literal is a metaphysical extraction of the symbolic—which is therefore not symbolic in any current sense. Ricœur too connects pollution with purification (SM 31), with independence of intentionality (SM 32-33), and with contagiousness (SM 34). In the light of this conception he is able to oppose pollution radically to the ethics of sin. Only the latter consists of the rupture of a personal relationship—with God (SM 72). As such, sin is not primarily a cosmic, but a historical phenomenon. Moreover, it is more internal to the sinner, pollution being more external (SM 19).

Not content with a description of the variations within pollution and sin, Ricœur believes that the symbols of pollution are superseded by those of sin. With pollution we are still in the irrational domain of terror (SM 31-32). Therefore it should be considered "un moment dépassé de la conscience." Pollution belongs to a "pre-ethical" stage (34) which is "corrected" by ethics on "a superior level of conscience of evil" (34-36).

The symbolism of defilement was necessarily shattered under the pressure of a new experience and gave way little by little to a new symbolism. If sin is primarily the rupture of a relation, it becomes difficult to express it in terms of defilement. (SE 70)(Fr. SM 72)

Nevertheless the force of the symbolism of pollution is retained at the ethical stage. For example, the Biblical terminology of pollution in the

book *Leviticus* is supposed to be "un ritualisme post-éthique" (SM 131).

Even at a stage still further advanced, that of guilt (more internalized than sin because no longer dependent upon a relationship between man and God as the forbidding father), the terminology of pollution is retained. Certainly in principle the cosmology of sin is such that only the sinner is responsible for his deeds. There is no cosmic constraint forcing man to sin. Nevertheless the terminology of pollution is meaningful at this stage, because despite his freedom man is confronted with the "radical evil" which was there before he was born. Although man is never forced by this primordial evil, he tends to be "seduced" by it. In this sense radical evil is still a primordial pollution. This being seduced is symbolized in the exteriority of an impure contact (SM 149).

Here we should stop and realize that the pollution which is retained at the higher level has also lost something of its ambiguous nature. At the higher level pollution has become symbolic, one might say; it is no longer a primordial force. Pollution has become symbolic pollution because it is a temptation to which in principle man can offer resistance. No longer does it belong to man's nature, as Ricœur himself acknowledges:

The symbol here points toward the relation of radical evil to the very being of man, to the primordial destination of man [...] then we shall understand that evil is not symmetrical with the good, wickedness is not something that replaces the goodness of a man; it is the staining, the darkening, the disfiguring of an innocence, a light, and a beauty that remain. However radical evil may be, it cannot be as *primordial* as goodness. (SE 156)(Fr.SM 149-50)

The reconciliation at the "higher" level has been bought at the expense of a banishment. Pollution has been transformed in such a way that it is separated from essential aspects of its ambiguity. Pollution has become a mere power of evil and can in principle be resisted. But in the *Antigone* pollution is not just an evil. It is one face of ambiguous power which is also the power of creation. From the perspective of the *Antigone*, Ricœur's question of whether good is more radical than evil cannot even be raised, because both are intertwined in ambiguous power. This primeval ambiguity of pollution is expelled in the "retaining" of pollution at the stages of guilt and sin.

The reconciliation of pollution and ethics obscures the fact that ethics is the expression of a metaphysical longing for order. This order can only be reached after pollution is expelled, but because the ambiguous power of pollution remains the ambiguous basis of ethics, it returns time and again in European cosmology in various disguises.

According to Ricœur, the evolutionary scheme is not restricted to the level of symbols. It applies to the level of myth as well. He discusses the

struggle of tragic myth with the Adamic myth. These myths differ radically. Whereas the Adamic myth is separative, in that the divine and the diabolical are not confused, the essence of tragedy is a melting pot of the God-like and the devilish:

The ambiguous figure tends toward the tragic when [...] the same divine power appears both as a source of good counsel and as a power to lead man astray. Thus the non-distinction between the divine and the diabolical is the implicit theme. (SE 213-14)(Fr. SM 201; cf. SM 169-70)

Such a concept is unacceptable to the Adamic mind because it contains the scandalous theology of predestination to evil (SM 200), and because no separation is made between ambiguous power and the sphere of the divine (SM 203). In opposition to the "unacceptable" tragic theology the Adamic myth professes the essential goodness of God and his creation (SM 170), a conception which is evidently "anti-tragic" (SM 289).

For Ricœur, the battle between tragedy and Adam is won by Adam. He has made the tragic god "caduc et impossible" (SM 225). But, like at the level of symbolism, the war is really only ended when the enemy is hauled into the camp of the victor and a reconciliation ensues. Having destroyed him, the Adamic myth reaffirms its enemy (SM 287, CI 291-92). Tragic myth is "incorporated" into Biblical myth, but—and that is what stands out—"à un rang subordonné" (CI 300). Ricœur acknowledges that at this level the reconciliation is very difficult indeed. Though the Adamic myth has gained the victory, tragedy remains "invincible" (SM 303). It survives its destruction by Platonism and Christianity (SM 291). It keeps haunting the victors as an unpalatable "residue":

The preeminence of the Adamic myth gives rise to the thought that evil is not a category of being; but because that myth has a reverse, or a residue, the other myths are invincible. (SE 328)(Fr.SM 304)

But if at the 'higher' level the Adamic myth leaves a residue which cannot be incorporated, how can Adamic myth be pre-eminent? Obviously, wishful thinking is the only option left for Ricœur to bring about a reconciliation between the indefatigable contestants. This option consists of no more than hope of a new, harmonious, future world as the *eschaton* of history. Only in the eschatological future can tragedy be incorporated totally, without leaving a dangerous residue of ambiguity:

Only a consciousness that had accepted suffering without reservation could also begin to absorb the Wrath of God into the Love of God [...] only *timid* hope could anticipate in silence the end of the phantasm of the "wicked God". (SE 326)(Fr.SM 303)

This last conciliatory move again has to leave a residue behind; tragedy cannot be totally incorporated into eschatological hope. Harmony is bought at the expense of exorcizing a fantasm: the ambiguous 'evil' god. This time the scapegoat is selected silently, within the hope of the *eschaton* of history. Ricœur's hope is no longer like the Sophoclean hope, a boon and a false lure of giddy desires (Ant 617). Eschatological hope is pure, but this purity is attained by suppressing ambiguity. Only in the light of such pure hope is it possible to maintain, as Ricœur does, that man's "essence" or "destination" is intrinsically "good," and that this essence can be separated from the mere "existential or historical" state of "alienation" in which man accidentally exists at the moment as a consequence of the actuality of evil (SM 155). From the tragic point of view this separation of man's 'good' nature from accidental evil is a sign of hope in its capacity of a false lure of giddy desires.

What deconstructivists denounce as a secret connection between monotheistic theology and philosophy is acknowledged by Ricœur: "The belief accorded to the pre-eminence of the Adamic myth is common to the way of the philosopher and the way of the theologian" (SE 310/SM 288). The basis of this kinship is that to both Adamic myth and philosophy the paradox and ambiguity of tragedy are unacceptable (cf SE 305, SM 200), implying that the victory of Adamic myth over tragedy is a victory of philosophy as well, and also that philosophy has to accommodate tragic myth.

Ricœur endeavours to effect this reconciliation at the level of language, attempting to incorporate the symbolic language of tragedy, with its paradoxes and ambiguities, into the ordered language of philosophical thought. Ricœur's final aim is to give new life to symbolic thought after its 'destruction' by separative philosophy (CI 305). He does not abandon philosophical rationality (CI 292), but tries to re-integrate the richness of symbolism, which had to be expelled, with metaphysics (SM 325).

Again it must be asked whether such a project of integrating symbolism into philosophy is a real integration or a separation within the ambiguous nature of symbolism. Ricœur's own remarks feed these doubts. He himself has pointed out the "impossibility" of formulating the tragic theology in coherent discourse (SM 213, 292), and the fact that philosophy is being undermined if it tries to speak of tragedy (SE 219/SM 206): "In order to express primordial incoherence, speech must become out of joint (*se disloquer*) and obscured." What aspects of symbolism must be exorcized in order to make it unobjectionable to philosophical thought is also made explicit by Ricœur. In offering an interpretation of Accadian and Babylonian myth he acknowledges that in these myths the origin of things lies beyond good and evil, that this origin is ambiguous power,

engendering both order and monstrosity (SM 169-70). This symbolism will never be acceptable to philosophical thought. It is quite understandable that Ricœur should call this a "terrible possibility," rendered in a "wild story." In the face of this wildness, philosophy has but one pharmaceutic remedy: "exorciser radicalement cette possibilité" (SM 170).

It is difficult to see how Ricœur could ever integrate tragedy into philosophy if one considers seriously his opinion of the tragedies of Sophocles. In the Sophoclean cosmology there is no end to tragedy (SM 214). They consist of a "non-dialectical contradiction" (SM 215). Admitting such contradictions into philosophy would mean the end of philosophy. In this respect the philosophies of Plato and Ricœur are analogous. They have to reject their own ambiguous foundation in order to reach the unimpaired identity of their separative cosmology.

8.3. Philosophical acceptance of tragedy

Since Nietzsche's confrontation with Dionysian power, philosophers have realized that a reconciliation of tragedy and philosophy at a higher historical level may be unattainable, because their cosmologies differ too radically. If tragedy is to be taken seriously, philosophical order has to be broken up, undermined, transformed. In this context Nietzsche demanded a transformation of philosophy in order to accept Dionysian disorder and duality. In the twentieth century, philosophers like Heidegger, Gadamer and Derrida, have tried in their own ways to open up philosophy to tragedy, not in order to reach a new stage in a historical evolution, but in order to accept the essence of tragedy as it transcends metaphysical order. Each of them tries to exert forbearance with respect to tragedy and specifically to the *Antigone*.

Under the term of 'forbearance' we take together a wide range of philosophies endeavouring to accept tragic ambiguity. To some philosophers the acceptance of tragedy implies the power to accept human limitations. To these philosophers—Gadamer is an excellent example—the confrontation with tragedy is the exercise of the ancient virtue of patience (*hypomone*), the power to endure (*karteria* – Gorg 507b), self-sufficiency (*autarkeia* – Aristotle EN I, X). In the eyes of others, especially Nietzsche, tragedy may teach forbearance, not with human limitations, but with Dionysian power. To Nietzsche, tragedy does not teach resignation but *amor fati* in its most pregnant sense: the embracing of power and duality.

1. Gadamer.

In the second chapter we pointed out that Gadamer recognizes the one-sidedness of the dialectical conception of experience. His philosophy

is in opposition to Hegel's where the latter's idea of a reconciliation of negativity at higher historical levels is concerned. Dialectical philosophy is a movement of interiorization of negativity which inevitably ends in a situation in which all possible negative experience has been incorporated into absolute spirit. Gadamer calls this idea of a reconciliatory dialectical movement—paradigmatically applicable to the fates of Antigone and Creon—'hybrid' (WM 285, 325). To the dialectical aspect of experience he opposes what he calls the hermeneutical aspect. He emphasizes that not all experience can be interiorized into an enlarged self-awareness of the spirit. Sometimes experience teaches us that we are unable to control all that happens to us. Then we have to face the fact that we are finite beings. According to Gadamer, this experience of human limitations is the religious lesson of tragedy. Man learns through suffering. Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* is adduced as chief witness for the character of hermeneutical experience, which is opposed to the hubris of dialectics. In his conception of learning through suffering Gadamer shows his prudential conception of tragedy. He is convinced that confronting his limitations makes man able to accept them. As man becomes experienced, he learns to know the limits of his predictions and planning. Experience teaches us acceptance of reality as it is (WM 339-40).

The idea that the experience of finiteness leads to man's acceptance of his position as a mortal in the universe is closely connected with Gadamer's conception of tragedy. Tragedy confronts its audience with a spectacle of division, but in his eyes this confrontation leads to the spectators' liberation. They become able to accept events as they have occurred. Through this acceptance they are also able to return to their own selves, which had become internally divided by tragedy. In the end, through tragic melancholy man's continuity with himself is heightened: the division (*Entzweiung*) is resolved (WM 125-26). According to Gadamer this affirmation of reality as it is is not confined to the spectators of tragedy. The tragic hero on stage partakes in the affirmation by accepting his own fate (WM 125). Therefore in the end tragedy is reconciliation (KS I 156-57). In the Attic theatre, all citizens were united in "cultic integration" (AS 66). This idea of tragic acceptance has determined Gadamer's conception of learning through suffering as it is exemplified in the *Agamemnon*: this learning is interpreted as learning to be prudent in accepting human limitations (WM 339).

Here we must ask whether this conception of tragedy as acceptance really accounts for its tragically ambiguous nature. We are convinced that Gadamer has left out the ambiguity of Greek tragedy and that this is patent in his interpretation of Agamemnon's learning through suffering. What was the substance of this learning? Did Agamemnon accept

reality? Not at all. The gods had brought him into a dilemma from which he could never escape. Zeus had sent him to Troy in order to punish the Trojans for their transgression of the divine law of hospitality in abducting Helena. Two eagles were sent to Agamemnon, apparently as a propitious omen. The birds however killed a pregnant hare, which incited the wrath of Artemis. According to the seer Calchas she considered the eagles to be the substitutes of Agamemnon and Menelaus. According to the law of talion Artemis demanded his daughter Iphigeneia as a substitute for the hare. Agamemnon had now become the sport of the conflicting divine powers. If he disobeyed Artemis he would resist the gods, if he sacrificed his daughter he would transgress divine law as well. It was, as he said, a heavy doom not to obey, but it was as heavy to kill the treasure of his house (Ag 206).

According to the chorus, Agamemnon learnt through suffering (Ag 177, 250) after his decision, taken in overweening temperament (Ag 215-16), to sacrifice Iphigeneia. But it has to be emphasized that this learning consisted of nothing else but the reiteration of his perverted sacrifice. He was sacrificed in his turn by Clytaemestra. For Aeschylus *pathei mathos* is the same as *drasanti pathein*: whoever acts is brought to heel (Denniston/Page CA xxvff). Learning through suffering does nothing to conceal the conflicting nature of the cosmos and it gives—just as in the *Antigone*—no hint at avoiding hubris by prudent acceptance of limits. *Pathei mathos* implies the opposite: hubris is unavoidable as long as man lives. Insight only comes when life is over.

If Gadamer had recognized that the tragic *anagnorisis* implies neither acceptance nor the possibility of prudent limitation, he would have to revise his interpretation theory completely. His hermeneutical philosophy is based on prudence in the Aristotelian sense. Like Aristotle, Gadamer bases his hermeneutics on the distinction between prudence (*phronesis*) and hybrid all-doing (*panourgia*) in interpretation (Aristotle EN VI 1144a26ff, WM 306). In this distinction however the tragic problem has already been overstepped. The question is: how is man able to distinguish prudence from hubris when both are indispensable to human life? Who can guarantee that interpretations do not share in man's combined orderliness and awesomeness?

2. Nietzsche.

In his reinterpretation of Schopenhauer's distinction between 'will' and 'representation' as the distinction between the Dionysian and the Apollonian, Nietzsche has brought philosophy into contact with the fundament of interconnectedness, the power which underlies and undermines separative order. Nietzsche's philosophy in the *Birth of Tragedy*, the book to which we will confine ourselves here (with the exception of some

remarks at the end of the section), is a glorification of ambiguity as it is exemplified in Dionysus. For Nietzsche tragedy does not, as it does for Gadamer, consist of a lesson of resignation to the inevitability of limits. This is clear from his polemics with Schopenhauer (in GT, Versuch einer Selbstkritik 16). Throughout his career Nietzsche has emphasized that tragedy has nothing to do with renunciation of happiness, hope, or the will to live (cf. GM III 828-29).

What tragedy can teach us, according to Nietzsche, is the nature of human hubris. Man can reach the heights in only one way: by committing felonies. Tragedy also teaches us that hubris will not last: the gods have to punish man in his noble striving for the summit (GT 59, cf. FW II 132).

In this fundamental opposition between overweeningness (*Uebermass*) and prudence, between over-measure and measure, lies the principal significance of the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo. Apollo is the ethical deity who demands measure (*Mass*) and prudent self-knowledge. As such he is the enemy of *Selbstüberhebung und Uebermass* (GT 33-34), the principal characteristic of Dionysus. Apollo is the god of order who "draws boundary lines." The danger which threatens him (as argued by Douglas) is that of formalism, of "Egyptian rigidity," which might cut off the movements of the sea of ambiguous power. Nevertheless from time to time the high tide of Dionysian power demolishes all boundaries (GT 60).

This opposition between ambiguous power and order propagates itself through a number of well-known cosmological categories. The Dionysian, for example, is the unbounded source of nature as against the boundaries of culture (GT 49). Put in front of the bearded satyr accultured man shrinks into a caricature. But at the same time the Dionysian is the unbounded force of life in opposition to the boundary of death. It is "das triumphierende Ja zum Leben über Tod und Wandel hinaus" (GD II 1031). Furthermore, Dionysus is an example of amoral power which is opposed to the limits of Apollonian morality and justice (GT 60, 118, 122, 131). And Dionysian life is power which transcends the limits of individuality: it is supra-individual (N III 791-92).

Finally the opposition is transformed to the category of insight. In *The birth of tragedy* (in contrast to Nietzsche's later work), the distinction between Dionysus and Apollo is also that between truth and appearance. The Apollonian sphere is "Täuschung" (GT 119), in contrast to Dionysian music which represents "the true idea of the world" (GT 119, cf. 121). (In this context Nietzsche also employs the opposition between 'Gleichnisbild' and 'Urbild' - GT 129).

It has to be emphasized that Nietzsche's Dionysus is not just unbounded life-power—he is not chaos or the *apeiron*. His characteristics have to be seen in relation to order. For example, Dionysus is "Uebermass" (GT 34). He is not even just power but also absence of power. This comes to the fore in the figure of Dionysus Zagreus, the god who is torn apart and scattered and who is both a horribly wild demon and a mild and meek sovereign (GT 61).

That Dionysus is not just independent power is also seen in Nietzsche's theory of tragedy. Here is it emphasized that Dionysian power cannot display itself without the channel of Apollonian order. Nietzsche is convinced that the chorus constitutes tragedy's original Dionysian element whereas the dialogues represent an Apollonian world of images (GT 52, 55). One implication is that the nature of tragic heroes is being conceived as primarily Apollonian. They are ordered, finite channels of Dionysian power and as such deceptive. Spectators tend to identify themselves emotionally with these individuals by pitying the heroes' destruction. Through that identification they are lured into Apollonian appearance. By identifying themselves emotionally with tragic heroes the spectators protect themselves against the confrontation with real Dionysian power (GT 117). Because tragedy offers these possibilities of identification with individuals it is a force of illusion. It merely presents the spectators with a faint image of the real world as it is revealed in Dionysian music (GT 118-19).

But according to Nietzsche this Apollonian identification with individual heroes is not the final level on which to interpret tragedy. In the real confrontation with tragedy the Apollonian semblances, incorporated in the fate of individuals, is superseded by Dionysian reality:

In the most essential point this Apollonian illusion has been broken through and destroyed. As a whole[...]the drama obtains an effect beyond all Apollonian artifice. In the total effect of the tragedy the Dionysian preponderates again. (GT 119)

This is the sense of the "Bruderbund," the "pre-established harmony" between Apollo and Dionysus in tragedy. Certainly Dionysus needs Apollo. For example, he has to express himself in Apollonian language. But the gods are not on a par. In the end Dionysus represents reality, whereas Apollo is only appearance.

This implies that the compassion which spectators feel for finite heroes is unreal and phenomenal. Reality is the lust which, through tragedy, can be felt in the identification with boundless Dionysian life:

[The audience] shudders at the sufferings which will befall the hero, but nevertheless it senses in them a higher much more overpowering lust (GT 121)

[...]the hero, the highest manifestation of the will, is destroyed to our satisfaction, because he is a mere appearance and the eternal life of the will is unaffected by its destruction. (GT 92)

The individual pain and destruction are thus mere phenomena compared to the reality of supra-individual life. It is interesting in this context to meditate on the kinship between the attitudes of Hegel and Nietzsche regarding the fate of individuals. In his early notes on tragedy Nietzsche expresses himself in the following way: "The narrow aim of the individuals is surmised as means of a world-design [*Weltplan*]. His destruction a surety that the world-design is promoted by him according to his part" (Colli/Montenari, 7.219). In both cases the individual fate is justified as part of the all-embracing order of the world. This implies that only on the basis of a movement of banishing phenomenality and individuality in favour of the totality of reality is Nietzsche able to consider Dionysian power as a unity:

The fundamental insight in the unity of all that is there, the consideration of individuation as the fundamental root of evil, art as the joyful hope that the spell of individuation may be broken, as an augury of a reinstated unity. (GT 62)

This unity however differs from the Hegelian harmony of opposites. In Nietzsche's conception Dionysus is a self-contradictory force. What does unity mean then? The unity Nietzsche professes is one of joyful forbearance of ambiguity, in all its negativity and conflictingness. Through all his oppositions and his dreadful aspects Dionysus is embraced and venerated as the eternal affirmation of all things. In Dionysus even the deepest melancholy becomes a dithyramb. Through Dionysian music and tragedy even "the most evil world" is "justified" (GT 133).

In light of this exaltation of indestructible life Nietzsche conceives tragedy as a "consolation" (GT 47), even as a "salvation" (GT 48-49). He goes as far as exhorting his readers to become Dionysian, to identify themselves with the unity of life (GT 93), in short, to become tragic themselves. Nietzsche hopes for a rebirth of tragedy: "Now dare to be tragic: for you will be redeemed" (GT 113). Man who is a forlorn wanderer is able to gain a homecoming (*Heimkehr*) in the celebration of Dionysus (GT 110, 121-22, 125, 127, 128, 132-33).

To understand how Nietzsche can conceive Dionysus as a justification of all the evil and terror which makes him a power of harmony—not the harmony of the Hegelian *Aufhebung*, but the harmony of acceptance of all division—we have to realize that Nietzsche is bound hand and foot to separative cosmology. Dionysus as the harmony of opposites is the conse-

quence of two essentially separative operations. In the first place Nietzsche conceives Apollo as the secondary, the phenomenal, in contrast to Dionysus' truth. This implies that Apollo is not really opposed to Dionysus. But before this exorcism of Apollo another banning order has been issued to which Henrichs refers when he argues that the opposition between Apollo and Dionysus prevented Nietzsche from placing the opposition between ambiguity and order *within* Dionysus: "Nietzsche [...] was far too preoccupied with the larger antithesis between Apollo and Dionysus to pay much attention to differentiation within Dionysus" (LSS 220). (We must warn the reader that this objection is only valid for Dionysus as he is represented in the *Birth of tragedy*, not for Dionysus in Nietzsche's later philosophy). By his separation of the two gods Nietzsche was able to purify Dionysus in a paradoxical way: to purify him of all purity. Thereby Dionysus was separated from one of his most fundamental aspects: that of civic order. Only after the banishment of civic Dionysus was Nietzsche able to embrace the unity of Dionysus as pure power.

In this preliminary separation Nietzsche has removed the divided nature of tragic Dionysus. Tragic Dionysus is not only boundless power. At the same time he is a representative of the banishment of power by order. He is not only an ambiguous confuser-god, he is also a founder of culture, even an upholder of the cosmos as a whole. He is the chorus-leader of the stars. He harasses and confuses man but he may also come "with purifying foot" to a sick city. In short, he is "many-named." The struggle between power and order is not a battle between Dionysus and Apollo, but the internally conflicting nature of Dionysus himself which was approximated by Nietzsche when he spoke of Dionysus Zagreus.

Because Dionysus is a self-contradictory unity of order and disorder it is humanly impossible to welcome him in his totality. To the Greeks Nietzsche's theory would be an expression of hubris. He overrates human forbearance with respect to the unpredictability and elusiveness of this many-named god. Nietzsche is like the citizens of Thebes in the *Antigone* who time and again cry for the return of the god, expecting to be able to enjoy his power, but who are as many times disappointed and let down by his unpredictable behaviour.

In this context it must be emphasized that in Sophoclean drama it is not unbounded life which is celebrated at the expense of the destruction of 'phenomenal' heroes like Antigone and Creon. The distinction between truth and appearance is not applicable to Sophoclean drama. This points to the dual nature of Dionysus as life-giver *and* as bringer of death, as chorus-leader of the stars and as confusing force which destroys man. To reduce Dionysus' destructive power over individuals to mere

phenomenality is exorcizing one aspect of his duplicity. Just because Dionysus has to be celebrated as the force of life *and* has to be feared as the force of destruction, his existence is an unbearable contradiction, as is shown in the fates of Antigone and Creon.

On this ground it is alien to tragedy to incite readers or spectators to become tragic or to hope for a rebirth of tragedy. Such hopes can only be cherished when Dionysus is separated from his very ambiguity. Tragedies are not romantic exhortations. They are neither pessimistic nor optimistic. In contrast to the wild Dionysus of some rituals the Dionysus of tragedy is power originally lacerated by its self-imposed limitations. In tragedy Dionysiac life force is not allowed to triumph completely. As Segal maintains:

Unlike the Dionysiac ritual, the Dionysiac art form enacts the power of the god but also reflects on the limits of that power[...] Unlike the other manifestations of Dionysiac power, the "drug" of the theatrical illusion is its own antidote, for it contains the process of awakening from illusion to reality. (DP 265-66)

Tragedy both acknowledges and transcends boundless power by also acknowledging the other face of Dionysus, that of order. The *Antigone* shows that tragedy itself consists of a contradiction, a conflict between the civic Dionysus and the ecstatic (Segal DP 14). Dionysus has to be celebrated. But every celebration of this god is insufficient because it will always neglect or be in conflict with other faces, with other names. The tragic finiteness of man is that he is unable to venerate in a self-contradictory way.

Once more we have to emphasize that tragedy never denies the human necessity to embrace order. Tragedy is not enthusiastic reverence of unlimited power. It is not subversive because it understands the limits of human forbearance. Sophocles does not exhort his spectators or readers to become Antigones. He points out that we are Antigones and Creons,—and Ismenes at the same time.

We are aware that Henrich's objection to the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo has to be confined to the *Birth of tragedy* because in his later philosophy Nietzsche has put aside the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo and brought order and power together in the self-contradictory appearance of Dionysus. But there is one point in which his philosophy remains unchanged: for him Dionysus is still the god of power, confusion and order who has to be and can be embraced. In this context tragedy continues to be a channel for embracing the whole of life in all its contradictions and ambiguities. Individual pain is still only a

"Folgeerscheinung" of cosmic joy (Nachlass III 693). Still the tragic artist is not considered a pessimist but in a sense, an optimist: according to Nietzsche he says yes to all that is questionable and dreadful. The tragic artist is Dionysian (GD II 961). Though in his later philosophy Nietzsche introduces Apollonian order into the realm of Dionysus, now it is as if Apollo has been swallowed completely in the universal acceptance of Dionysus. This enabled Nietzsche to consider Dionysus as the "holy road to life" (GD II 1032) through all horror and destruction:

The one who is richest in fullness of life, the Dionysian god and man, is not only able to allow himself the spectacle of the dreadful and the questionable, but even dreadful action and every luxury of destruction, disruption, negation. In him evil, nonsense, and ugliness appear as if they were permitted, as the consequence of a surplus of creative, fertilizing powers. (II 244-45, cf. II 1109-10)

Despite Dionysus' ambivalence and temptation (he is the "Zweideutige," the "Versucher-Gott" - JGB II 755) he continues to be a unity in the sense that his duality and ambiguity are accepted, that his most evil aspects are welcomed. Again we must emphasize that a philosophy of acceptance of duality is separative where the tragic unbearableness of duality is concerned. In Nietzsche's fusion of man and Dionysus the tragic duality of man being both Dionysian and its opposite, and being unable to bear that duality, has disappeared.

3. Heidegger.

It is impossible to say anything of Heidegger's interpretations of the *Antigone*, either in the *Einführung in die Metaphysik* or in *Hölderlins Hymne 'der Ister'*, without being acquainted with his philosophy of Being. Of course it is impossible to present the reader here with a thorough interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy. Nevertheless we will try to give a rough sketch of it insofar as it is of importance to the interpretation of the tragedy.

According to Heidegger, Europe lives under the sway of metaphysical thinking as instituted by Plato. This thinking is exclusively directed on beings as they are used or known and on their essence which is conceived as belonging to the category of beings as well. This exclusive attention to the beings which are there and to their essence obscures the movement which makes entities and categories of beings possible, Being. Being is not an essence or an idea underlying the beings. It is not another entity. It is rather the movement of apportioning through which categories of being emerge, transform themselves and die off. Being as the movement of assigning categories cannot be separated from beings. It is the difference between Being and beings which constitutes the subject of Heidegger's thinking.

The movement of Being which has apportioned metaphysical thinking to modern Europe has resulted in the whole of European thinking and living becoming determined by the technical approach of reality. The world we live in is a world of manipulable objects in a storage of energies which can be summoned to use at any chosen moment (TK *passim*). We Europeans live in a world of beings which is organized in a technical way. In the ubiquitous technical way of life it is shown in an exemplary way that Being is forgotten in favour of beings. The technical approach of the world has a tendency to consider itself as the only possible approach. Other approaches are suppressed. More importantly, what is also forgotten is the Being of technique which is radically different from technical beings. That the Being of technique is forgotten is obvious when we realize that problems which arise through the technical approach of reality generally do not give rise to reflection but to adducing more technique. What is forgotten—and this forgetting is no accidental lapse but the essential way in which the technical form of life exists—is the Being of technique. In the modern epoch however it has become a necessity to reflect on Being. This reflection shows that technique is not primarily the employment of a means to an end, but a mode of approaching reality which has been apportioned to modern man. Reflection on this approach may reveal that the Being of technique is one way of disclosing reality which transforms itself internally and which need not be the exclusive mode of approaching it.

Reflection on the Being of technique may teach us that by the technical approach we constantly try to become masters of beings and to be secure within their realm. In short, we try to be at home within the whole of beings. These endeavours to be at home among the beings however conceal and obscure the fundamental danger, the danger that the Being of technique is forgotten in an exclusive focus on technique and more technique. In Heidegger's eyes the technically subdued world obscures man's homelessness in the realm of beings, a homelessness which endangers him. The fact that this homelessness is forgotten uproots man in an even more pregnant way. By being at home in the technical world and forgetting that he is not at home in Being, man is no longer at home with himself (EM 120). The apparent absence of distress in the technically disclosed world is essentially the highest distress:

The partly recognized, partly disavowed homelessness (*Heimatlosigkeit*) of man regarding his Being (*Wesen*) is replaced with the institution of the conquest of the earth [...]. By the success of his accomplishments and the regulation of ever greater masses of people man is driven to a flight for his own Being, in order to represent this flight as the home-coming into the true humanity of the homo humanus. (N II 394-95)

In the light of his idea that the whole of Occidental civilization is threatened by ruin through forgetting the difference between Being and beings Heidegger considers it a necessity to listen to Sophocles' *Antigone* (HHI 81). Confrontation with this tragedy might bring man eye to eye with the danger of ruin through homelessness and with the road to coming home. First of all we have to study his interpretation of the first stasimon and its key word *δαινός*. Heidegger gives various translations of the word. In its application to the forces of nature he translates it as "overwhelming" (*überwältigend*), in its application to man's confrontation with nature as "violent" (*gewalttätig*). The most fundamental translation however shows that man, being a violator, cannot be at home in overwhelming nature. This translation is "homeless" (*unheimlich* and *unheimisch*). In these interpretations Heidegger points to a duplicity in the concept of *τὸ δαινόν* which may have some kinship with the duplicity we distinguished in it. According to Heidegger the whole of beings is a whole of overwhelming movement. Man is a being as well and as such he belongs to this whole. But man has a specific position. He has to cope with the whole of beings, to him beings are disclosed as such. Therefore their Being is disclosed (or closed) to him. Man is awesome in an even more pregnant sense than ordinary beings because he needs violence to be at home in the world of beings (EM 115).

One aspect of tragedy is that because man needs violence in order to be at home among the beings he always transcends his limits and then reaches the opposite of his aims. He becomes homeless. This homelessness is not confined to man's relations with beings. Through his language, his moods, his passions, man is open to Being but this contact is violent as well and therefore is another aspect of man's homelessness (EM 119ff.). The fundamental problem of man is that he traces his roads in Being but that by his hybrid behaviour he gets entangled in appearance and ends in deadlock. Then he is excluded from Being (EM 121).

Heidegger sketches man's tragic duplicity when he calls man an in-between (*Zwischenfall*) who vacillates between his own violence and the order of Being (*Δίκη*). He argues that man can reach no harmony, because his actions are necessarily daring, and thereby hybrid and violent. Un-being and disorder belong to man's very nature. That means that he is nowhere at home, neither among the beings nor in Being (HHI 91). This division is not man's avoidable aberration. Man's duplicity reflects the division of Being itself. Everything that is, is permeated with its opposite (Hum 189, HHI 64, 83). Evil is an ineradicable aspect of Being (HHI 96, 104).

Sophocles' tragedy teaches us first of all that the whole of beings is not

primarily the whole of utensils and ready-made objects, but overwhelming movement (cf. HHI 90). It also teaches us that man's hybrid violence in confronting the power of beings is no moral defect, but the inevitable intermingling of greatness and baseness which belongs to his nature (EM 125).

In his interpretation of Antigone's fate, however, Heidegger goes one step further. Her fate shows that man's homelessness among the beings and in Being is not the last word. Her death shows that homelessness has to be reflected upon from the point of view of Being as a specific form of hominess (*das Heimische*) (HHI 134). The *Antigone* is conceived as another duplicity: that between man's homelessness among the beings and in Being, and a possible coming home in a belongingness to Being (HHI 147). Though the level on which homelessness is being conceived is totally different, Heidegger speaking of the difference between Being and beings, his conception of coming home has some resemblance to Nietzsche's. Homecoming is not leaving aside homelessness but integrating it, assimilating it, accepting it.

This is the sense in which Heidegger interprets Antigone's remark to Ismene (95-96): "But leave me, and the folly that is mine alone, to suffer this awesome thing." According to him, Antigone here accepts her total homelessness. Through this acceptance she is conceived as being able to come home in Being. This does not imply that her homelessness has been removed. In and through accepting her inevitable homelessness in her hour of death she comes home in Being. "Her dying[...]is her belonging to Being. Her dying is her coming home, but a coming home in and through that homelessness" (HHI 129).

According to Heidegger, this is what poetry in its highest sense is about: man's ability to be at home ("*das Heimischseinkönnen des Menschen*") (HHI 151-52). True poetry, as Sophocles' *Antigone* is, may be one road through which the destruction of the Occident is revealed. This consciousness may eventually enable man to wait patiently for a reversal in Being, a reversal which may bring salvation: "Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch."

Despite Heidegger's many cogent remarks regarding the *Antigone* (for example, his impressive description of the duality of Creon and Antigone - HHI 64), he interprets Antigone's fate as a coming home in Being, and speaks of tragedy as a possible road to salvation for Europe, showing that his thinking remains foreign to Greek tragedy. To Greek tragic protagonists like Creon and Antigone, the duality of divine order and human fate remains unacceptable. For them there is no coming home, not even in accepting the homelessness of Being. In maintaining that for

tragic heroes their destruction is the deepest affirmation of awesomeness (EM 125), and that in dying Antigone comes home, Heidegger is assimilating the heroes' fate to his philosophy. But this assimilation is a separation of the heroes from their tragic predicament, a predicament that allows no coming home, neither among the beings nor in Being.

The fundamental reason for this separation by assimilation is that Heidegger is moved by his concern for the destruction of Europe. He longs for a new and harmonious place for man in Being with respect to earth, heaven, the gods and mortality. In his eyes this is the meaning of poetry and philosophy. By revealing what is disastrous (*das Heillose*) they lead man on the road to discovering traces of holiness (*das Heilige*) (Hw 294-319). Heidegger is concerned about man's homelessness. In that respect he differs radically from Sophocles. Sophocles is not concerned about man's homelessness, nor about the salvation of Being. He does not hope that man may be at home on the earth, under the sky, in his relations with the gods and mortality. He merely presents us with reality as it is, without any ulterior motive. By his descriptions devoid of hope he reveals the hopelessness of Heidegger's concern. Man is unable not to wear out the earth, not to offend heaven and the gods, he is unable ever to accept death. Since Heidegger is moved by hope's giddy desires, he has to disregard the absence of hope. This absence of hope is the essence of the tragic viewpoint which temporarily shatters every hope of coming home in a divided and malicious cosmos.

Conclusion

If there is one transformation of philosophy in which the paradoxical position of tragedy inside and outside European cosmology has been revealed in the most pregnant way, it is Derrida's grammatology. Derrida's thinking is based on the recognition that we Europeans live in a cosmology of separateness. Our "logocentric" metaphysics is based on the principles of identity and non-contradiction which distinguish philosophy from myth (P 72). According to Derrida, philosophy is characterized by the demand for purity, presence, constancy, coherence. Time and again he shows that this separative order has been bought at the price of exorcizing forms of disorder and marginality which nevertheless are the basis of separative order, while the expelling of disorder is a procedure forced to use aspects of the self-same disorder it is banishing. A convincing example of Derrida's uncovering of our cosmology's concealed foundation is his analysis of the ambiguous meaning of *pharmakon* in Plato's philosophy.

Derrida is fully cognizant of the ineluctable strength of separative cosmology. In his eyes it is utterly impossible to transcend this cosmology by disregarding its underpinning in a new form of thinking. Metaphysical thinking cannot be destroyed. Nevertheless he is convinced that this cosmology may be undermined from inside, by parasitic, dislocating, twisting, doubling modes of interpretation. He speaks of subversion (Gr 12, 39), dislocation (Gr 13-14), transgression (Gr 16), unbalancing (Gr 25) and deconstruction (Gr 39). His aim is the deconstruction of European knowledge in general: the concept of *episteme* and the whole logocentric metaphysics (Gr 68, P 49).

Derrida's undermining practices are characterized by the fervent desire to offer resistance against our cosmology's separating and harmonizing pressures. Separation presupposes an unseparated but conflicting reality which is primary, but which must be partly exorcized for the sake of clearness and distinctness. And harmony is always bought at the price of an assimilation of difference which is another form of exorcism. Derrida knows that this separative pressure is irresistible. The desire to put strict boundaries around the games of writing and re-writing is irrepressible (Gr 87). Nevertheless he offers indefatigable resistance to this uncontrollable desire for separative order. Time and again he tries to reintroduce the waste products of separation and harmony, rejected but ever dangerous, into cosmology. He tries to reintroduce the *pharmakon* into the purity of order. Against the desire for dialectical harmonization by appropriation he undertakes a never-ending effort at disappropriation (P 59, LI *passim*).

With respect to the conflicting relationship between Dionysian power and Apollonian order Derrida is extremely cautious. He gives an admirable description of Nietzschean affirmation of the unpredictable cosmic game, speaking of Dionysian affirmation as the joyous acceptance of the cosmic game, the affirmation of a faultless universe, without truth, without origins, in surrender to absolute chance and indeterminacy (ED 427). But Derrida does not opt for the embracing of ambiguous power. He is interested in the insoluble difference between order and ambiguity, which is also the common ground of Apollo and Dionysus (ED 428). Grammatology is not primarily Dionysian, it is 'obscene' in a literal sense, it works in the wings (Greisch HG 10) of separative cosmology. It is an engagement in division (*engagement dans la division* - Diss 390) against the harmony of separativeness.

What Derrida expects from his dislocating efforts is not always clear. But there are signs that he believes that these dislocations indicate the beginning of a new epoch (Greisch HG 72). His aim is to stand back from philosophy (without transcending it) in describing its laws and to look in

the direction of something totally different (M v). His thinking focuses on a world to come which has already announced itself, beyond the enclosure of knowledge (Gramm 14). From the point of view of separativeness, this future can only be anticipated as absolute danger and a monstrosity. (Insofar as Derrida doubts the possibility of dislocating separative cosmology—which also happens in his writings—it is not clear what distinguishes parasitism from a Gadamerian continuation of tradition).

In the context of this philosophy of undermining duality Derrida interprets the *Antigone*. He calls Antigone an apparition which cannot be accommodated in any order, neither the order of the Greek polis nor that of Hegel's *Phänomenologie*, nor the order of European cosmology in general. She is "inassimilable," "l'indigeste absolu" (Gl 170). She is the element excluded from order but nevertheless assuring its possibility (Gl 183). Her impossible existence in the crypt exemplifies the darkness beyond and within order (Gl 187). The question now is: what meaning can this realization have for European cosmology?

Man cannot live without imposing order, and imposing order implies the creating of scapegoats. The reintroduction of waste products into order does not imply that a situation could ever emerge in which banishment no longer occurs. The pharmaceutical system is not confined to separative cosmology; in a different sense, it lies at the root of interconnected cosmology as well. Derrida himself emphasizes that the system of banishment of disorder is not only the basis of European cosmology but of "certain non-Greek structures of mythology as well" (Diss 194). In the highly improbable case that the undermining of separative order were to succeed, the only result would be a different order with a different concomitant procedure of exorcism. The best Derrida's parasitism can hope for is a new variation of pharmacy, just as Plato's pharmacy was a variation of the pharmacy of Sophocles. What the *Antigone* shows is not that order can be undermined, but that order is as inevitable as its destruction.

A second remark concerns the nature of Derrida's undermining efforts of re-reading and re-writing. Will efforts of reading and writing ever be able to influence separative cosmology? We doubt it. The *Antigone* would be an excellent candidate for such parasitism. It is one of the pillars of our cosmology, yet totally alien to it. Its subject is the conflict between power and order. Yet its reintroduction into our cosmology will have no effect at all, because interpretative efforts have no real influence on cosmology. A cosmology rests on cultural factors such as the economic transformation of nature, communication with the divine sphere by means of ritual practice, social relations, and so on. That these aspects

of culture may be viewed as different forms of writing, as Derrida does, does not alter the fact that an act of writing or reading in a more limited sense is totally incapable of undermining these roots of cosmology. Even if we are able to write about a cosmology characterized by internal conflicts and ambiguity we continue to belong to our own cosmology. However tortuous and parasitic it may be, writing does not transcend separateness, because our writing is based on the whole network of separateness.

Trying to write in the margins of our cosmology does not imply genuine contact with ambiguous power. The unbridgeable distance between a separative undermining of separateness and interconnected tragedy is illustrated by their respective attitudes regarding marginality, transgression and pollution. Derrida affirms subversiveness and transgression; he is proud of being a parasite; he relishes the role of the rebel and the nomad. Such desire and such enjoyment are only conceivable in separative cosmology, where the danger of pollution or punishment from the divine sphere has been exorcized completely. In Sophocles' cosmology it would have been inconceivable for anyone to be proud of being a polluter. Being part of interconnected cosmology, the protagonists of the *Antigone* are the very opposite of parasitic marginals. They long for order and are plunged into disorder against their dearest wish. Only a cosmology of interconnectedness can be in contact with power in so far as it is connected with pollution and with the duality of the human and the divine sphere. The power of subversion is its faint separative echo, separated from awesomeness. The ambiguity of order and power cannot be reactivated, either by patience or by subversion. To us, the protagonists of the *Antigone* are literary figures, not heroes.

This does not imply that our separative culture 'lacks' ambiguity and tragedy, or that it has suffered a loss: there is no supra-cultural point of view from which the gains and losses can be totted up. We can only say that the *Antigone* is part of our innermost being, but that it is also beyond reach. It is a blank in our cosmology which has no power either to propagate or to dislocate it. Our inability to experience this gap in our cosmology is not a tragedy, because our separative life is untragic.

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